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INTRODUCTION
Public corporations in the United States and the United Kingdom
are—from the global perspective—so very similar that it has become a
commonplace in the comparative corporate literature to treat them as if
they were practically identical. Notably, large American and British
corporations tend to finance their operations through public offerings of
stock on well-developed capital markets to dispersed, passive investors,
none of whom possess substantial voting power. By contrast, large corporations throughout the rest of the world tend to be financed and dominated by controlling families, banks, corporate groups, or governments.1
1. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471
(1999); see also John Armour & David A. Skeel, Jr., Who Writes the Rules for Hostile Takeovers,
and Why?—The Peculiar Divergence of U.S. and U.K. Takeover Regulation, 95 GEO. L.J. 1727,
1751 (2007); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 133 (1999); Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of
Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 154 (2009); Geoffrey Miller, Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 51 (1998); Brian R.
Cheffins, Putting Britain on the Roe Map: The Emergence of the Berle-Means Corporation in the
United Kingdom 9–11 (Revised draft of a paper presented at the 1999 Tilburg Conference on
Convergence and Diversity in Corporate Governance Regimes and Capital Markets, Feb. 2000),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=218655.
Measuring ownership concentration has presented a significant empirical challenge, and by
various measures other countries appear to exhibit similar levels of dispersal, but there are sound
reasons to treat the United States and the United Kingdom as the quintessential dispersed ownership systems. Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, for example, find similarly low levels of control
over listed companies (defined as twenty percent share ownership) in Japan, China, and the Netherlands. See PETER ALEXIS GOUREVITCH & JAMES J. SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND
CORPORATE CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 17–18
(2005). As they observe, however, de facto control is considerably more centralized in these
countries due to the keiretsu system of cross-shareholding in Japan, substantial government control in China, and the separation of control from cash-flow rights in the Netherlands through the
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Moreover, while corporate governance systems in other countries often
aim explicitly to balance the competing claims of various “stakeholders” in the corporate enterprise, the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance
systems tend to place greater emphasis on generating investment returns
for public shareholders, leaving other stakeholders—such as employees
and creditors—to bargain contractually for what they can. These traits
reflect a shareholder-centric and market-oriented approach to corporate
governance that may be fairly described as uniquely “AngloAmerican.”2
In their corporate governance systems,3 financial structures, and
business cultures more generally, the United States and the United
Kingdom “arguably have more in common than any other pair of developed economies.”4 Striking as these broad similarities may appear,
however, they tend to divert attention from the substantial differences
between the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems—differences
of great practical and theoretical significance. Though described in
some detail below,5 the fundamental point of divergence can be simply
stated: Shareholders in the United Kingdom are, in fact, far more powerful, and far more central to the aims of the corporation than are
placement of stock in “trust offices” rather than with investors directly. Id. at 18, 183.
2. See Cheffins, supra note 1, at 12–13; see also Peter A. Hall & David Soskice, An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE 1, 8–10, 19 (Peter A. Hall & David Soskice eds.,
2001).
3. Throughout the Article, I refer to “corporate governance systems” to emphasize that decision-making within a corporation is not solely a matter of corporate law (or company law, as it is
called in the United Kingdom). Although definitions vary enormously (see, for example,
GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 1, 293–95), I use the term to describe the rules governing
decision-making within the corporation, whether they reside in corporate law or elsewhere.
4. Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1751; see also Bernard S. Black & John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. REV.
1997, 2001 (1994); Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 460 (2001).
Some scholars have argued that the structure of common-law legal systems, as in the United
States and the United Kingdom, plays a decisive role in the emergence of shareholder-centric
corporate governance systems, as well as in the growth of capital markets that are characterized
by dispersed shareholders. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 1; Rafael La Porta et al., Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3 (2000); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and
Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997). However, while the corporate governance systems of other countries with common-law legal traditions, such as Australia and Canada, do share certain commonalities with the corporate governance systems in the United States and the United Kingdom,
these other common-law countries in fact differ markedly because ownership of their corporations tends to be dominated by blockholders. See BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP
AND CONTROL: BRITISH BUSINESS TRANSFORMED 5–6 (2008); Cheffins, supra note 1, at 13.
5. See infra Part II.

582

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 50:3

shareholders in the United States. U.K. shareholders possess considerably greater corporate governance authority and capacity to discipline errant officers and directors. In addition, U.K. shareholders benefit from
fiduciary duties and a conception of corporate purpose that focuses far
more clearly on their interests than is the case in any U.S. state6—
including Delaware, the jurisdiction of incorporation for most U.S. public corporations.7 The practical consequence is that U.K. shareholders
loom much larger in the boardroom than U.S. shareholders do.8 Additionally, the theoretical consequences of this divergence are of equal or
greater significance for those seeking to understand public corporations
and the societal roles they play. As I will argue, the differing posture of
shareholders in the United States and the United Kingdom suggests that
public corporations in these countries do not, in fact, perform identical
functions in their respective societies. Put differently, the purpose of the
U.S. corporation and the purpose of the U.K. corporation are not, strictly speaking, the same.9
6. I have argued elsewhere that corporate governance in the United States in fact reflects an
underlying ambivalence regarding the merits of shareholder power and the consistency of shareholders’ interests and incentives with those of society at large. See generally Christopher M.
Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008).
7. The Delaware Division of Corporations boasts that over “850,000 business entities have
their legal home in Delaware including more than 50% of all U.S. publicly-traded companies and
63% of the Fortune 500.” Delaware Division of Corporations, Why Choose Delaware as Your
Corporate Home?, http://corp.delaware.gov (last visited Feb. 26, 2010). See also WILLIAM T.
ALLEN ET AL., COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 88–90
(2d ed. 2007). Under the internal-affairs doctrine, the state of incorporation governs a corporation’s internal affairs. See id. at 87. Numerous attempts to shift incorporation to the federal level
have failed, though federal securities laws have increasingly made incursions into the realm of
corporate governance. See generally Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 215 (1999).
8. Though beyond the scope of this Article, note that the U.K. bankruptcy system is likewise
substantially more creditor-centric than the U.S. bankruptcy system. Thus, one might generalize
that a greater focus on the residual claimant prevails in the United Kingdom than in the United
States. See John Armour, Gerard Hertig & Hideki Kanda, Transactions with Creditors, in
REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 115, 149–50 (2d ed. 2009); La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note
4, at 1135–38; Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, The Political Economy of Finance, 17 OXFORD
REV. ECON. POL’Y 502, 514–15 (2001); see also David Millon, The Single Constituency Argument in the Economic Analysis of Business Law, 24 RES. L. & ECON. 43, 47–49 (2009). On the
relationship between bankruptcy law and corporate governance—and the effects that debt financing can have on corporate governance more generally—see John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins &
David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Ownership Structure and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1699 (2002) [hereinafter Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure]; David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519,
1550–62 (2004).
9. See infra Parts III–IV.
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That the United States and the United Kingdom would diverge on
such a fundamental matter as the purpose of the corporation is surprising enough in light of the legal, financial, and cultural similarities between the two countries. But it is even more striking that, between the
two, the United Kingdom would exhibit the more shareholder-centric
corporate governance system, given the countries’ relative political
leanings. To the degree that the two countries differ in political orientation, the United Kingdom is typically thought to be the more leftleaning. For example, a poll conducted by the Economist in 2008 that
assessed “Anglo-Saxon attitudes” regarding “a number of social, political and economic matters” concluded that Americans and Britons “may
have less in common than they think”—and specifically that “Britons
tend to have more left-wing views than Americans.”10 Yet shareholdercentrism, as a normative position, is typically associated with the economic right.11 Given these facts, one might reasonably have predicted
that any divergence between the United States and the United Kingdom
would reveal a greater degree of shareholder-centrism in U.S. corporate
governance, but that is emphatically not the case.
Unraveling why the United States and the United Kingdom differ in
this fundamental way should be of great intrinsic interest to scholars of
comparative corporate governance, but, as this Article aims to demonstrate, this inquiry is not merely a philosophical exercise. Ultimately,
the comparative perspective on these corporate governance systems indicates that the larger social and political goals that these countries pursue through the institution of the public corporation are not coextensive. I argue that the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems
diverge because of the different ways in which they relate to external

10. Anglo-Saxon Attitudes, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2008, at 71. For purposes of the poll, “‘left’
implies a big-state, secular, socially liberal, internationalist and green outlook; right, the reverse.”
Id.
11. See, e.g., David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform:
Employment at Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975, 976–77 (1998). Millon explains
that “[s]cholars who have expressed concern about the social costs of shareholder primacy have
been labeled ‘communitarians’”—a term associated with “progressive” politics. Id.; see also
MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT,
CORPORATE IMPACT 2–3 (2003).
Note that the “law and economics movement,” which has strongly advocated shareholder
wealth as the proper metric of corporate governance, “start[ed] in the United States and from
there spread[] all over Europe.” See Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Company Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 1161, 1184–86 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann
eds., 2006).
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regulatory structures that affect relationships among stakeholders in the
corporate enterprise.12
I begin with an examination of methodological challenges faced in
comparative studies generally, and in comparative corporate governance
in particular. I argue in Part I that much recent comparative corporate
scholarship reflects a functionalist approach. By functionalism, I mean
an analytic approach that assumes that corporate governance regimes
have been crafted to manage identical, or at least very similar, sets of
broadly defined problems. Chief among these problems is minimizing
agency costs. In suggesting that corporate governance regimes differ
mainly in their approaches to commonly defined problems, this formulation tends to obscure the very real differences in how these corporate
governance systems function, and diverts attention from the possibility
that differing degrees of shareholder orientation reflect more deepseated differences in social views and market structures. Put differently,
a clear examination of comparative methodology forces us to confront
the possibility that differing corporate governance structures in fact
represent differing institutional responses to political and social challenges. By the same token, however, the move away from functionalism
raises an equal and opposite problem—excessive contextualism, introducing a degree of historical, cultural, and political contingency that
threatens to render meaningful comparison impossible. Ultimately, I select the prevailing politics in each country as my explanatory variable,
but I focus particularly on policies that affect social welfare protections
available to non-shareholders—notably, employees. This approach, I
believe, permits a more nuanced exploration of divergence and change
over time in the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems than functionalist approaches can achieve, while avoiding the debilitating contingency of a broad contextualist approach.
Part II proceeds to provide an overview of significant differences between these systems. Whereas in the United States—and, notably, in
Delaware—shareholders’ capacity for autonomous action and ability to
discipline boards and officers are relatively circumscribed, effectively
leaving disgruntled shareholders with only limited ex post (and often
expensive) means of redress, U.K. shareholders possess far greater capacity to intervene in management decision-making ex ante, and they
possess virtually unfettered freedom to sell the firm to a hostile bidder.
12. Cf. John Parkinson, Corporate Governance: The Company Law Review and Questions of
‘Scope,’ 8 HUME PAPERS ON PUB. POL’Y 29, 39–41 (2000) (“[C]ompany law is only one of a
number of factors that influence the operation of the corporate economy.”).
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U.K. shareholders also benefit from directors’ duties that focus far more
intently on their interests.
I turn to potential explanations for this divergence in shareholder
orientation in Part III. Although I acknowledge the importance of institutional differences that have been identified in the comparative corporate literature, and I broadly accept that the earlier rise to prominence of
institutional investors in the United Kingdom was critical to the emergence of its shareholder-centric corporate governance system, I nevertheless argue that these factors cannot explain the political stability of
this approach over the course of decades. A complete explanation of the
divergence between U.S. and U.K. corporate governance requires addressing the range of regulatory structures that affect relationships
among stakeholders within the corporation, as well as the political, social, and cultural factors affecting perceptions of shareholders’ interests
and incentives. These factors, I argue, are critical to understanding the
political equilibrium struck in each country, of which the corporate governance system is just one part. Through such an examination of
broader political forces, I develop the argument that stronger stakeholder-oriented social welfare policies and legal structures permitted the
U.K. corporate governance system to focus more intently on the interests of shareholders without giving rise to political backlash and, conversely, that weaker stakeholder protections have inhibited the U.S. corporate governance system from doing the same. A particularly vivid
example discussed in this Part is the impact of employee health care on
takeover regulation, with the employer-based U.S. system arguably resulting in greater political pressure to account for employee interests in
takeovers relative to the United Kingdom, where health care is not
linked to employment status. In developing the broader political argument, I distinguish my approach from other political theories of corporate governance, which I argue fail to account for the divergences discussed here.
My view is that the political paradox of greater shareholder orientation in the more left-leaning country contains the key to its own resolution—so long as we understand corporate governance in relation to other institutions and regulatory structures through which relationships
among corporate stakeholders are established and regulated. Notably, an
important factor permitting the U.K. corporate governance system to
evolve toward a high degree of shareholder-centrism—and to have this
shareholder centrism represent a stable political equilibrium over time—
was the fact that employees enjoyed social safety nets and employment
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protections substantial enough to diminish the perceived need to demand greater regard for their interests within corporate governance itself.13 In the United States, on the other hand, the fact that extracorporate protections have always been quite limited has resulted in the
imposition of substantial political pressure on legislatures and courts to
permit some regard for stakeholders’ interests by corporate management
(that is, the officers and directors), thereby inhibiting the emergence of a
starkly shareholder-centric corporate governance system.14
This analysis, I argue, holds important implications for comparative
corporate governance, as well as for domestic debates regarding the future of corporate governance in the United States. In Part IV, I argue
that my analysis exposes substantial shortcomings in comparative theories predicting—and in some cases, advocating—convergence on a
shareholder-centric model of corporate governance, to the degree that
those theories fail to address the historical, cultural, and political factors
that have conditioned the relative degree of shareholder-centrism observed in the United States and the United Kingdom. More broadly, I
argue that my analysis casts doubt on the descriptive power of economically driven theories of corporate governance built on the portrayal of
the corporation as a purely private endeavor—a depiction of relations
among corporate stakeholders that, while popular among academics,
bears only limited resemblance to observed reality.

I.

FUNCTIONALISM AND CONTEXTUALISM IN COMPARATIVE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Much recent scholarship in the area of comparative corporate governance is underwritten by faith—often unexamined15—that juxtaposing
13. See infra Part III.B. Others, to be sure, have argued that the degree of shareholdercentrism in a given corporate governance system is intimately related to the degree of broader
stakeholder protections. For example, Martin Gelter argues that the degree of “shareholder influence” under a given ownership structure affects the degree of employment protection in a given
legal system. See Gelter, supra note 1, at 132–34; see also Marianna Belloc & Ugo Pagano, CoEvolution of Politics and Corporate Governance, 29 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 106 (2009). In contrast, I argue that extra-corporate stakeholder protections are a critical factor in the coalescence of
a shareholder-centric corporate governance system. As I argue below, a dynamic process may be
at work, with the corporate governance system and extra-corporate stakeholder protections evolving in response to one another. See infra Parts III–IV.
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 11, at 339, 341; see also David S. Clark, Developments of Comparative Law in the United States, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE
LAW, supra, at 175, 210.
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corporate governance systems from various countries and cataloguing
apparent similarities and differences will generate useful information.
The predominant methodological approach can be termed functionalist,
in that regulatory systems are viewed as presenting a range of potential
institutional solutions to universally encountered problems.16 With respect to corporate governance in particular, the tendency toward functionalism has been reinforced over recent decades by the rise of the law
and economics movement. Law and economics proponents tend to view
the corporation as a purely private endeavor in which the fundamental
legal problem is easily generalized and universalized—minimizing
agency costs where one actor (for example, management) exercises control over resources belonging to others (in this case, shareholders’ money).17 “Modern economic theory,” Klaus Hopt observes, “has developed
the principal-agent problem as its basic question,” and “company law
reform initiatives in all industrialized countries have tried to address this
problem.”18 Hopt attributes “a new and increased interest in comparative company law” directly to the law and economics approach, which
purports to render corporate governance structures amenable to something resembling scientific investigation.19
The best known recent example, The Anatomy of Corporate Law—a
book reflecting “collaboration among nine authors from six countries,”
including Hopt—describes itself as “predicated on the idea of a field of
corporate—or company—law, with problems and legal strategies that,
at a mid-level of abstraction at least, are independent of the laws of specific jurisdictions.”20 Methodologically, then, the book is “functional” in
its focus on “the economic logic of corporate law.”21 From this perspective, the core and universal problem of corporate law is “reducing the
scope for value-reducing forms of opportunism among different constituencies”—that is to say, agency costs, whether between managers and
16. See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 15, at 342; Russell A. Miller, Comparative Law and Germany’s Militant Democracy, in US NATIONAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY:
FROM THE CHURCH COMMITTEE TO THE WAR ON TERROR 229, 236–37 (Russell A. Miller ed.,
2008).
17. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 14–15 (1991). “Agency costs” arise from imperfect alignment of the agent’s
and the principal’s incentives. Id. For an in-depth discussion of the concept, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). Conceptions of the corporation associated with the
law and economics movement are discussed in greater detail in Part II.A.
18. Hopt, supra note 11, at 1166; see also Gelter, supra note 1, at 129–30.
19. Hopt, supra note 11, at 1172, 1184–86.
20. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at vii.
21. Id.

588

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 50:3

shareholders, among shareholders, or between shareholders and other
stakeholders.22 Others, such as Lucian Bebchuk, have implicitly adopted
a functionalist approach in advocating shareholder-oriented reforms in
the United States that are based at least in part on the model of the United Kingdom. Bebchuk points to the U.K. corporate governance system
as evidence that “shareholders’ lack of power to initiate major corporate
decisions is not an inevitable element of the legal structure of the modern corporation.”23 Noting the predominance in both countries of widely
held companies, Bebchuk argues that the United States should similarly
embrace greater shareholder power.24 It is assumed that U.S. corporate
governance should adhere to the same metric of appropriate policy—the
interests of shareholders—and regard for the interests of other stakeholders is dismissed as a ploy that is aimed solely at justifying entrenchment of the incumbent board and greater “management slack.”25
In functionalist work of this sort, the purportedly common problem—
minimizing agency costs—is effectively treated as the independent variable. Corporate governance, as the institutional response to that problem, is treated as the dependent variable.26 The Anatomy of Corporate
Law, to be sure, is explicitly descriptive rather than normative, taking no
formal position on the convergence debate.27 It should be observed,
however, that even in advancing such descriptive claims, the functionalist approach to comparative law tends to be strongly suggestive of convergence. The purpose of the book, after all, is to emphasize “the underlying uniformity of the corporate form” throughout the world.28 And
22. John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 1, 2; see also Skeel, supra note 8, at 1521, 1528–29 (observing Kraakman et al.’s “functional approach”).
23. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 847–48 (2005)
24. See id. at 847–50.
25. See id. at 837, 908–13.
26. In general, the term “dependent variable” describes “the variable the investigator wants to
account for or explain,” while the term “independent variable” describes “the variable . . . that the
investigator thinks may account for, or affect, the different values the dependent variable assumes.” ROGER BAKEMAN & BYRON F. ROBINSON, UNDERSTANDING STATISTICS IN THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 48 (2005) (emphasis removed). Bakeman and Robinson observe that
while the terms have traditionally “been reserved for true experimental studies,” today they are
used more broadly to “indicate not necessarily experimental manipulation, but simply how investigators conceptualize relations among their variables.” Id. at 48–49 (emphasis removed); see also
GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 15. Bakeman and Robinson warn, however, that broader
usage of such terms “should not lull us into making stronger causal claims than our procedures
justify.” BAKEMAN & ROBINSON, supra, at 49.
27. See Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 5, 29.
28. Id. at 1.
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while the authors “do not believe that every aspect of corporate law is
economically rational, still less that any particular corporate law is optimal,”29 choosing a static causal variable naturally tends to facilitate
emphasis of core commonalities in outcomes and requires the characterization of what variations do occur as deviations from some efficient or
optimal solution to the common problem.30
It has been aptly said that “no model is better than its assumptions.”31
The validity and utility of conclusions drawn from such comparative
studies, then, will depend critically on accurate identification of a true
common problem, and this determination is where functionalism encounters a substantial challenge. Critics of this approach to comparative
law emphasize what they term the “functionalist fallacy”—the fact that
the functionalist must assume the universality of a problem, regardless
of context, in order to render regulatory institutions susceptible to
straightforward cross-border comparison, to evaluate their optimality, to
forecast or advocate convergence on a given type of institution, and so
on.32 Similarly, critics have highlighted the functionalists’ “faith” in the
“mono-functionality” of regulatory institutions—the notion that we can
identify some clear, singular function of a given type of regulatory
structure, without reference to context.33
Strictly speaking, such strong criticisms are not fairly leveled at The
Anatomy of Corporate Law, which acknowledges “the very real differences across jurisdictions” and advances the more modest claim that the
commonalities are “at least as impressive.”34 I broadly accept the core
claim that business corporations the world over “have a fundamentally
similar set of legal characteristics”35 and that the similarities between

29. KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at vii.
30. See Michaels, supra note 15, at 339, 342.
31. Helen Callaghan, Outsiders and the Politics of Corporate Governance: How Ownership
Shapes Party Positions in Britain, Germany and France, 42 COMP. POL. STUD. 733, 757 (2009).
32. Günter Frankenberg, Comparing Constitutions: Ideas, Ideals, and Ideology—Toward a
Layered Narrative, 4 INT’L J. CONST. L. 439, 444–45 (2006); see also Ruti Teitel, Comparative
Constitutional Law in a Global Age, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2570, 2570–78 (2004) (reviewing
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND MATERIALS (Norman Dorsen et al. eds.,
2003)) (describing this problem in the context of comparative constitutional scholarship).
33. See Michaels, supra note 15, at 351; see also Caroline Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Societies, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 269, 275–76 (1999).
34. Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 22, at 1.
35. Id. The authors describe the “core structural characteristics of the business corporation” as
including “(1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) transferable shares, (4) centralized management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership by contributors of capital.” Id. at 5;
see also id. at 5–16 (describing the core structural characteristics of the business corporation).

590

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 50:3

U.S. and U.K. public corporations are even more prominent.36 Ultimately, however, while there is great value in identifying and exploring these
commonalities,37 this model provides only limited means of explaining
divergences across countries and changes in corporate governance practices over time. Specifically, divergences that cannot be explained as
functional equivalents, and changes that cannot be explained by reference to clear efficiency benefits, will ultimately prove explicable only
by reference to history, culture, and politics.
A country’s perceived needs and regulatory responses to them will
inevitably be “interlinked,” as Caroline Bradley puts it, with broader
“social, economic, and political structures.”38 Indeed, virtually all legal
rules derive meaning from their interrelationship with other rules in a
given legal system, and “must be fully understood and embraced not only by law enforcers, but also by those using the law”—what Katharina
Pistor calls the “living legal system.”39 Consequently, social needs and
regulatory responses will inevitably be bound up with each other. As
Ralf Michaels observes, society’s needs are articulated in part by reference to preexisting regulatory structures within that society. Regulatory
responses, in turn, will be understood by reference to how those needs
have been articulated, and so on in a culturally contingent “hermeneutic
circle” that would appear to foreclose the identification either of universal problems or of distinct, mono-functional regulatory solutions—the
dual building blocks of the functionalists’ methodological framework.40
The relevance of historical, cultural, and political context to comparative law is inescapable, and appeal to these factors will effectively reveal the outer boundary of the explanatory domain of any functionalist
36. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. Others have fairly suggested that this heightened degree of similarity permits more nuanced evaluation of U.S. corporate governance. See,
e.g., Black & Coffee, supra note 4, at 2000–02; Cheffins, supra note 1, at 2–3.
37. As Katharina Pistor argues, for example, providing “access to information on how different legal systems create mechanisms of accountability for common problems”—including corporate directors’ obligations—could “enable domestic agents to identify problems and find solutions
that are adequate and potentially effective given the institutional constraints their country faces.”
Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing Economies, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 97, 126–27 (2002); see also Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165
(2003).
38. See Bradley, supra note 33, at 314; see also Allan Cochrane et al., Comparing Welfare
States, in COMPARING WELFARE STATES 1, 7 (Allan Cochrane et al. eds., 2001); Miller, supra
note 16, at 238.
39. See Pistor, supra note 37, at 98–99.
40. See Michaels, supra note 15, at 353–69; see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at
58; cf. Frankenberg, supra note 32, at 447–51 (examining a similar dynamic in the context of
comparative constitutional law).
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theory of corporate governance—a point ultimately conceded in The
Anatomy of Corporate Law.41 Yet, such considerations are themselves
fraught with difficulties. “If the contextualists are right and context
thwarts the borrowing that functionalism sought to promote,” then, as
Russell Miller observes, “comparative law runs the risk of being reduced to little more than socio-legal tourism.”42 Consequently, comparative theorists who are mindful of the twin challenge that functionalism and contextualism present have sought a way to manage the tension
not by reconciling them, but by paying careful attention to the strength
and defensibility of the claims advanced through comparative legal
analysis. Miller, for example, adopts a “discursive” method focusing on
the “social milieu” from which a given legal norm emerges, anticipating
that such analysis “might enlighten, as a social critique, the understanding of one’s own social milieu.”43 In a similar vein, Michaels advocates
recognition of “similarity in difference,” that is, “finding that institutions are similar in one regard (namely in one of the functions they fulfill) while they are (or at least may be) different in all other regards.”44
Accordingly, Michaels urges caution in advancing evaluative conclusions regarding the best or optimal law, notably because the multifunctionality of regulatory institutions in the real world “makes a comprehensive evaluation almost impossibly complex.”45 The comparativist
does stand on more solid methodological ground, however, when evaluation is constrained to criteria internal to a given legal system. “Functionalist comparison can open up our eyes to alternative solutions,” Michaels observes, “but it cannot tell us whether those alternative solutions
are better or not.”46
41. See KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at vii–viii; Paul Davies et al., Beyond the Anatomy,
in KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 313. The second edition of the book focuses more intently
on these issues, exploring the extent to which divergences across countries “can be understood as
functional adaptations to differences in institutions . . . and how far they appear to be historical,
cultural, or political artifacts driven by distributional rather than functional concerns.” John Armour, Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in
KRAAKMAN ET AL., supra note 8, at 35, 51.
42. Miller, supra note 16, at 243; see also Michaels, supra note 15, at 367–68.
43. Miller, supra note 16, at 243.
44. Michaels, supra note 15, at 371.
45. See id. at 375–77; cf. Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance and Employees in the
United States, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON 33, 44–45 (Howard Gospel & Andrew Pendleton eds., 2005) (“[B]ecause governance institutions are complex, path-dependent, and embedded in complex social systems, haphazard borrowing does not guarantee an improvement in the borrower’s economic performance.”).
46. Michaels, supra note 15, at 379–80; cf. Clark, supra note 15, at 210 (describing comparative law as “a ‘subversive’ discipline” that “can promote cultural criticism, which allows us better
to understand our basic assumptions about law”).
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Undoubtedly the conflicting impulses of functionalism and contextualism caution restraint in the conclusions drawn from comparative
studies. At the same time, however, it is important to recognize the opportunity that this insight presents for a more nuanced understanding of
regulatory structures and strategies in different countries—including in
the realm of comparative corporate governance. In particular, relaxing
the assumption that corporate governance systems in different countries
respond to a single common problem forces us to address the possibility
that regulatory divergences reflect not differing degrees of success by
some universal objective metric, but rather differences in what each society expects corporate governance to achieve. Regulatory divergences
may actually reflect variation in the social needs and problems that each
society aims to address through the corporate governance system.
In the remainder of this Article, I will argue that this is, in fact, what
a careful comparison of the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems reveals. To assert that the defining problem of corporate governance is the management of some form of agency cost is effectively to
take the issue of corporate purpose off the table. A single constituency,
often public shareholders, is declared to be the principal, at least economically, if not in the legal sense.47 This move implicitly forecloses
meaningful examination of corporate purpose, or how each country
conceptualizes the aims and ultimate beneficiaries of the corporate enterprise.48 While acknowledging broad structural similarities of the sort
emphasized in functionalist comparative scholarship,49 I reject any implicit assumption that issues of corporate purpose are treated identically,
identifying divergence both as to power and purpose within U.S. and
U.K. public corporations. Effectively, I take the broader prevailing politics in each country as my independent variable. These politics are a dynamic set of processes that permit a more nuanced exploration of why
the divergence has occurred between these two countries and how corporate governance has changed over time within each of them.50 To
47. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 105 (observing that “corporate directors are not legal
agents of the corporation” under U.S. law).
48. Cf. David Millon, State Takeover Laws: A Rebirth of Corporation Law?, 45 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 903, 903 (1988) (observing that “doctrinal preoccupation with accountability takes
for granted an underlying principle,” namely that a “corporation exists for the financial benefit of
its shareholders”).
49. See, e.g., supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.
50. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 7–8 (observing that “constants” cannot serve
as independent variables where the effort is to explain change); Pagano & Volpin, supra note 8, at
504, 517; Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial
Development in the Twentieth Century, 69 J. FIN. ECON. 5, 7 (2003).
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avoid the problem of excessive contingency, however, I focus on a specific set of political issues that I believe has particular explanatory power with respect to the development of corporate governance systems—
the politics of the welfare state and related structures that impact social
protections available to non-shareholders. In the final Part of the Article,
I explore the implications of this mode of analysis for both comparative
corporate governance and for reform-oriented debates concerning the
U.S. corporate governance system.

II.

SHAREHOLDERS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

Corporate governance systems in the United States and the United
Kingdom clearly exhibit substantial similarities. As observed at the outset, public corporations in both countries tend to be widely held by dispersed, passive shareholders, none of whom possess voting control, and
both countries’ corporate governance systems tend to emphasize shareholder interests to a greater extent than one finds elsewhere.51 Though
undoubtedly accurate by global standards, this generalization falls far
short of a full and accurate picture of how these systems evolved and
how they function today. The two systems in fact differ quite substantially in their degree of shareholder orientation, a point of divergence
that, I argue, gives rise to important practical and theoretical implications.
To facilitate this analysis, this Part provides an overview of corporate
regulatory structures in each jurisdiction to illustrate the divergence.
The aim is not to present a comprehensive catalogue of distinctions between the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems, but rather to focus on those particular regulatory structures (summarized in Figure 1
below) that most clearly reflect the divergence in terms of shareholder
power and orientation toward shareholder interests.

A.

The Ambivalence of U.S. Corporate Governance

Although a “staple narrative of comparative corporate governance”
holds that “Anglo-Saxon systems . . . do not take stakeholder interests
into account,”52 this in fact represents a gross oversimplification of the
U.S. corporate governance system. In prior work, I have discussed the
“ambivalence” of U.S. corporate law “with respect to each of three fun51. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
52. Gelter, supra note 1, at 131.
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damental and related issues: the locus of ultimate corporate governance
authority, the intended beneficiaries of corporate production, and the relationship between corporate law and the achievement of the social
good.”53 To facilitate the comparative discussion that follows, I briefly
develop that argument here, focusing particularly on the shareholders—
the constituency for which U.S. corporate law exhibits the deepest ambivalence.54
Contrary to the broad characterization of “Anglo-Saxon” systems as
single-mindedly pro-shareholder, U.S. corporate law in fact sharply
constrains the power of shareholders to undertake independent action.
The Delaware General Corporation Law, which governs most U.S. public corporations,55 establishes in section 141(a) the broad principle that
“[t]he business and affairs of every corporation . . . shall be managed by
or under the direction of a board of directors.”56 Majority shareholders
cannot directly compel the board to take any particular action,57 and apparently cannot be given the power to do so.58 In other words, “the corporation has a republican form of government, but it is not a direct democracy.”59
To be sure, it is the shareholders who elect the board,60 and the Delaware courts have taken a decidedly dim view of board actions primarily aimed at interfering with the effective exercise of the “shareholder
franchise,” which one Delaware jurist famously described as “the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of directorial power
rests.”61 This formulation obviously tends to characterize board power
as derivative of a shareholder-granted mandate.62 Yet, beyond the election of directors, the shareholders’ scope of unilateral action is quite
53. Bruner, supra note 6, at 1386. I intend no pejorative connotation in using this term. Rather, I use it to describe a state of balancing “either or both of two contrary or parallel values,
qualities, or meanings.” 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 388 (2d ed. 1989) (defining “ambivalent”). Compare William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1096 (2002)
(characterizing Delaware law as “ambivalent” on shareholder primacy), with William T. Allen,
Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 261
(1993) (describing the modern U.S. corporation as “schizophrenic”).
54. See Bruner, supra note 6, at 1427–32.
55. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
56. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001).
57. See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 100–05.
58. See Bebchuk, supra note 23, at 888–90.
59. ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 101.
60. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001).
61. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (Allen, C.).
62. See Bruner, supra note 6, at 1395.
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narrow. As a default matter, shareholders can remove directors “with or
without cause.” But, if the board is classified—meaning that it has been
divided into classes elected in subsequent years (a common practice)63—then shareholders may remove directors without cause only if
the charter expressly permits it.64 The ability of Delaware shareholders
to remove directors is further impeded by the fact that shareholders cannot call special meetings unless expressly given such power in the charter or bylaws.65 Shareholders likewise cannot initiate a fundamental
transaction66 or a charter amendment.67 Both of these actions require
prior proposal by the board, effectively installing the board as a “gatekeeper”68 and rendering any such endeavor at most a “shared enterprise,” as the Delaware Supreme Court put it.69 Indeed, the Delaware
63. See DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 519 (3d ed. 2005)
(reporting that almost sixty percent of large U.S. corporations in a 2004 survey reported having
classified boards). Note, however, that Senator Charles Schumer’s (D-N.Y.) “Shareholder Bill of
Rights Act” would, among other things, require that exchange-listed companies hold annual
board elections. See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009) (adding a
new § 14A to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); see also infra note 364. Naturally, the proposal has been lauded by institutional shareholders and reviled by corporate management. Compare Press Release, Council of Institutional Investors, CII Applauds Introduction of Shareholder
Bill (May 19, 2009) (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law), available at
http://tinyurl.com/yatdpg3, and Press Release, California Public Employees’ Retirement System,
CalPERS Backs Federal Legislation to Create Shareholder Bill of Rights (May 19, 2009) (on file
with the Virginia Journal of International Law), available at http://tinyurl.com/ow4u4a, with
Press Release, Business Roundtable, Business Roundtable Statement on Senator Schumer’s Proposed Shareholder Bill of Rights Act (May 19, 2009) (on file with the Virginia Journal of International Law).
64. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d), 141(k)(i) (2001). For U.S. corporations, the charter (typically referred to as the “articles of incorporation” in corporate statutes) represents the core governance document, and contains a handful of mandatory items, such as the company’s name and
address, the nature and purpose of the business (generally phrased to embrace “all lawful acts and
activities,” as permitted by the statute), the authorized stock, and the incorporators. See id.
§ 102(a). The charter may also address various other topics, notably including a waiver of directors’ monetary liability for breaches of the duty of care. Id. § 102(b)(7). The actual governance
mechanics typically appear in the “bylaws,” which must conform to the charter, but which can be
unilaterally amended by the shareholders or—if the charter so permits—by the directors. Id.
§ 109. On the nature of the charter and the bylaws more generally, see ALLEN ET AL., supra note
7, at 91–93.
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d) (2001).
66. Id. §§ 251(c), 271(a) (requiring that the board propose mergers and sales of substantially
all assets for shareholder approval).
67. Id. § 242(b) (requiring that the board propose amendments to the certificate of incorporation for shareholder approval).
68. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 217, 234.
69. See Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, Inc., 818 A.2d 914, 930 (Del. 2003). It should be
noted that shareholders in corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange have more expansive voting rights, including “in any transaction or series of related transactions” involving
issuance of common stock equaling twenty percent or more of the previous outstanding shares or
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statute does not even contemplate the possibility of giving shareholders
such unilateral power (say, by express charter provision), suggesting
that such a move would be invalid.70 The authority for direct action that
shareholders do possess, such as suing directly or derivatively to vindicate a breach of fiduciary duty,71 tends to be quite limited and post
hoc.72 As Robert Thompson aptly put it, U.S. shareholders effectively
have three modes of action: “They can vote, sell, or sue.”73
Even this formulation, however, may overstate the powers of shareholders in the United States, because in the critical context of corporate
takeovers, which are said to represent an important means of disciplining management,74 target boards are afforded substantial latitude to interfere with the shareholders’ freedom to sell their stock to a hostile
bidder. In its 1985 Unocal opinion, the Supreme Court of Delaware
purported to apply “enhanced” scrutiny to a target board’s deployment
of defensive tactics, requiring that the board earn the protections of the
business judgment rule (a presumption that board decisions are informed and taken in good faith75) by showing “reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed”
and that the defensive measure taken was “reasonable in relation to the
threat posed.”76 Subsequent opinions applying Unocal, however, have
revealed just how board-friendly the standard is. For example, in Moran
v. Household International, Inc., the court permitted preemptive adoption of a poison pill, concluding that the very existence of coercive tenvoting power, and for any “issuance that will result in a change of control.” See NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE, LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.03(c)–(d) (2009), available at
http://nysemanual.nyse.com/lcm.
70. See Bebchuk, supra note 23, at 889.
71. In a derivative suit, a shareholder seeks to advance a corporate claim. Because the decision regarding whether or not to advance a corporate claim is, in the first instance, the board’s to
make, a Delaware shareholder who seeks to advance a derivative claim must either make “demand” on the board (that is, for the board to advance the claim itself) or convince the court that
doing so would be “futile” (say, because the claim is against the board). See Levine v. Smith, 591
A.2d 194 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
72. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601, 603 (2006).
73. Thompson, supra note 7, at 216; see also ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
93–105 (1986).
74. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 614.
75. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
76. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55 (Del. 1985); see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1377–87 (Del. 1995) (indicating that the second step
of the Unocal test requires that the defensive measure be neither “preclusive” nor “coercive,” and
fall within a “range of reasonableness”).
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der offers in the marketplace was a sufficient threat and that the ability
to dislodge the pill through a proxy contest—by first replacing the recalcitrant board—rendered it a proportionate response to that generalized threat.77 Then, in Paramount v. Time, the court reasoned that section 141(a) and the business judgment rule placed “the selection of a
time frame for achievement of corporate goals” in the board’s discretion.78 This permitted the Time board to refuse to negotiate with Paramount, a hostile bidder, and to conclude that its own plan for the company—involving $10 billion in new debt to finance a cash tender offer
for Warner, its preferred strategic partner—offered better long-term
benefits for Time’s shareholders than the all-cash, all-shares, fifty-nine
percent premium offer that Paramount had made for Time itself.79
In essence, this Delaware case law awkwardly phrases the rejection
of shareholder power by reference to the shareholders’ own interests. As
Lyman Johnson observes, “the chief attraction of the long-run phantom
is its marvelous ability to apparently harmonize management discretion
with shareholder primacy while, in fact, sweeping the whole thing under
the rug.”80 But Delaware’s takeover case law goes further, tending to
reject a shareholder-centric conception of corporate purpose as well.
The Delaware Supreme Court did state in Revlon v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holding, Inc. that in some instances the board is required to focus single-mindedly on the shareholders’ interests, but the duty to maximize short-term return to shareholders is narrowly limited to circumstances where a sale, break-up, or change of control of the company has
become “inevitable.”81 Beyond such instances, Unocal itself explicitly
permits the board to consider the effects of a hostile bid on “the corpo77. 500 A.2d 1346, 1350, 1354 (Del. 1985). A poison pill, or “shareholder rights plan,” attaches rights to the company’s common stock that, if triggered by an unauthorized bid for the
company or accumulation of stock beyond a specified threshold (say, fifteen percent), would
permit all shareholders except the hostile bidder to buy heavily discounted stock. The threat of
substantial dilution provides a powerful deterrent against hostile takeover attempts. See ALLEN ET
AL., supra note 7, at 536–39.
78. Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990).
79. See id. at 1149–54.
80. Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 902 (1990); cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 429 (2001)
(describing the Paramount v. Time outcome as meaning that “a decision reducing the immediate
market value of the Time shareholders’ interests by thirty-five percent did not violate the directors’ duties of loyalty or care”).
81. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986); see
also Paramount Commc’ns v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43–44 (Del. 1994) (addressing
change of control cases).
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rate enterprise” more broadly, including “the impact on ‘constituencies’
other than shareholders” such as “creditors, customers, employees, and
perhaps even the community generally.”82
The authority of target boards in the United States to look beyond the
interests of shareholders in responding to hostile bids is even clearer and
farther reaching outside Delaware. Many states have adopted “other
constituency statutes” that unequivocally establish the legitimacy of
such considerations in the hostile takeover context, and in some states,
in all board decision-making.83 Over recent years shareholders have endeavored to assert themselves in the takeover context through use of
their unilateral authority to enact bylaws—for instance, by proposing a
bylaw restricting the adoption or maintenance of a poison pill—but the
Delaware Supreme Court has yet to decide how far the shareholders can
go in carving back the board’s statutory management authority.84 If the
court’s takeover cases are any indication, no straightforward answer will
be forthcoming.85
The emergence and ramifications of the U.S. approach to hostile
takeover regulation will be examined in greater depth below,86 but for
the moment the critical point is the ambivalence it reflects regarding
shareholders’ governance capacity, as well as the consistency of their
interests and incentives with those of the broader public.87 This ambiva82. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). Revlon additionally
states that regard for non-shareholder constituencies under Unocal must involve “rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.” 506 A.2d at 182. As Paramount v. Time makes eminently clear, however, the extraordinary discretion afforded the board to determine what is in the
shareholders’ long-term interests likely saps this statement of any substantial force. See supra
notes 79–80 and accompanying text.
83. See Bruner, supra note 6, at 1420–21.
84. See id. at 1442–48. On these competing sources of statutory authority, compare DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) (giving the board authority to manage the “business and affairs” of the corporation), with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109(a) (2001) (giving shareholders the
unilateral and inalienable right to enact bylaws “relating to the business of the corporation” and
“the conduct of its affairs”).
85. See Christopher M. Bruner, Shareholder Bylaws and the Delaware Corporation, 11
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 67 (2009).
86. See infra Part III.C.
87. Beyond these state corporate law structures, management is further insulated by the Williams Act, a set of federal securities rules that, among other things, ensures ample warning that a
hostile bid may be in the offing—notably the requirement that five-percent beneficial owners
publicly report their plans and intentions for the company. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a)
(2009) (requiring a public filing on Schedule 13D upon becoming “directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more than five percent” of a public company’s stock); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101,
item 4 (2009) (requiring disclosure on Schedule 13D of “the purpose or purposes of the acquisition of securities,” including “any plans or proposals” relating to acquisition of further securities,
fundamental transactions, or “change in the present board of directors or management”).
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lence is further reflected in the nature of the board’s fiduciary duties.
Delaware has long adhered to the view that management owes fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty “to the corporation and its stockholders” simultaneously,88 a formulation reflecting a studied ambiguity regarding
whose interests should prevail when push comes to shove. To be sure,
the shareholders are favored over other constituencies as a practical
matter, at least insofar as they alone can sue directly for breaches of fiduciary duty and pursue derivative litigation in the corporation’s name
(so long as the corporation remains solvent, anyway).89 But at the same
time, this formulation reflects a decided reluctance to focus solely on
the shareholders, to the exclusion of the other constituencies contributing to the corporate enterprise—a reluctance further reflected in the absence of a clear duty to maximize shareholder wealth in any but the narrowest circumstances, the enormous discretion afforded management
under the business judgment rule,90 and the takeover jurisprudence described above. As Johnson has suggested, Delaware’s ambivalent statement of fiduciary duties long persisted as “a pragmatic doctrinal accommodation” of differing views on the nature of the corporation, but
with the rise of hostile takeovers, which clearly pit the interests of
shareholders against those of other stakeholders, “the dormant tension
between duty to the corporation and duty to its shareholders resurfaced.”91 Delaware’s awkward doctrinal approach to hostile takeovers
primarily reflects a strong desire to avoid clear endorsement of either a
shareholder- or stakeholder-oriented conception of the corporation, even
in the face of transactions with clear winners and clear losers.92
As I have argued elsewhere, none of the prevailing theories of corporate governance can account for the ambivalence reflected by these core
principles of U.S. corporate law.93 The shareholder primacy theory—the
view that shareholders straightforwardly “own” the corporation, and
88. Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming
Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99 (Del. 2007) (reiterating the Guth formulation).
89. See supra note 71 and accompanying text; Gheewalla, 930 A.2d at 101–03 (clarifying that
creditors have derivative standing once the company becomes insolvent, but not before, and that
they never have direct standing to sue for fiduciary breaches).
90. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 299–309 (1999); Bruner, supra note 6, at 1402, 1418–21; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 770–76
(2005); Johnson, supra note 80, at 900–02.
91. Johnson, supra note 80, at 900 n.133.
92. See infra Part III.C.
93. For a more detailed treatment of the theories discussed here, see Bruner, supra note 6, at
1395–1408.
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thus are entitled to dictate its aims in the way that any principal would
direct her agent94—is plainly contradicted both by the sharp constraints
placed on shareholder action and the range of structures permitting deviations from shareholder wealth maximization. The remaining theories,
however, do not fare much better. The “team production” theory of the
corporation, developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, styles the
board as a “mediating hierarch” with the duty and capacity to protect all
of the various corporate stakeholders from opportunism at the hands of
the others, facilitating the range of firm-specific investments required
for a successful corporate enterprise.95 This theory of corporate governance depends critically on the characterization of directors as “trustees
for the corporation itself,”96 without favoring any particular group, because otherwise their claim to protect all stakeholders from opportunism
would lack credibility. As David Millon observes, however, the board’s
substantial discretion under the business judgment rule does not support
this view of the corporation, and in fact tends to contradict it. As Millon
explains, the “very discretion that allows corporate boards to pay attention to nonshareholder as well as shareholder interests also allows them
to pursue shareholder value with relentless disregard for social costs.”97
In this light, the board’s discretion under the business judgment rule is
every bit as inconsistent with the team production theory as it is with the
shareholder primacy view described above. Blair and Stout likewise fail
to account for the privileged position of shareholders in advancing derivative claims on the corporation’s behalf,98 as well as the fact that the
formulation of fiduciary duties in Delaware, ambivalent as it may be,
does mention just one constituency by name—the shareholders.99
The “nexus of contracts” view of the corporation—probably the leading theory of corporate governance among U.S. academics100—also fails
94. See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, at SM17. More moderate work in this vein is discussed in Bruner,
supra note 6, at 1405–07.
95. See Blair & Stout, supra note 90, at 269–81. See generally Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence
H. Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 33 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988).
96. Blair & Stout, supra note 90, at 281.
97. David Millon, New Game Plan or Business As Usual? A Critique of the Team Production
Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1001, 1022 (2000).
98. See id. at 1013.
99. See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 99–103
(Del. 2007).
100. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 26 (2002) (“[I]t is fair
to say that the economic theory of the firm is now the dominant paradigm in corporate law. Not
only legal scholars, but also judges and lawyers are becoming adept at using economic analysis.
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to account for the fundamental characteristics of U.S. corporate law.
Though there are variations on the theme, the core claim is that the corporation, as a descriptive matter, is fundamentally private and contractual in nature, and, as a normative matter, ought to be treated as such.
Specifically, as Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel express it, the
idea is that “corporate law should contain the terms people would have
negotiated, were the costs of negotiating at arm’s length for every contingency sufficiently low,” and that, in practice, it “almost always conforms to this model.”101 As to how the hypothetical negotiation among
the various parties (e.g., shareholders, boards, employees, creditors, and
communities) would work out, the claim is that they would favor strong
boards—and correlatively weak shareholders—for the efficiency of
such an arrangement. The apathy of public shareholders and heterogeneity of their interests are said to justify only weak voting rights, particularly in light of the disciplinary potential of the market for corporate
control.102 However, rational shareholders with a mere residual claim in
an enterprise over which they have limited formal control would demand the right to elect the board, and would also demand fiduciary duties focusing squarely on their interests.103 Stephen Bainbridge takes
these claims substantially further in his “director primacy theory,” arguing that the board is itself the nexus at the heart of the corporation,
wielding “sui generis” powers as “a sort of Platonic guardian”104—a
claim rooted in a particularly strong view of the superiority of centralized management.105
Those adhering to the nexus view typically argue that other stakeholders, such as employees, creditors, and communities, are entitled only to what they can secure through “explicit, negotiated contract”106 and
that corporate law should not mandate regard for non-shareholders. The
preferable alternative is “to alter incentives by establishing rules that atHence, even those who reject economic analysis must respond to those who practice it.”).
101. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 15.
102. See id. at 70–71; see also Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 607, 614, 623. A shareholder’s
choice to remain passive where the costs of action exceed the benefits is typically described by
economists as “rational apathy.” See ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 178.
103. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 36–39, 92–93; Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 577–
85 (2003). It should be observed, however, that a contractarian approach to corporate law does
not inherently preclude regulation aimed at redressing flaws in the bargaining process. See Joseph
F. Morrissey, A Contractarian Defense of Corporate Regulation, 11 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J.
BUS. L. 135 (2009).
104. See Bainbridge, supra note 103, at 560.
105. Id. at 554–59.
106. EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 37.

602

VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 50:3

tach prices to acts, such as pollution and layoffs, while leaving managers free to maximize the wealth of the residual claimants subject to the
social constraints.”107
The shortcomings of the nexus view as a descriptive account of the
U.S. public corporation’s internal governance are substantial. As Easterbrook and Fischel acknowledge, the argument that disciplinary effects of hostile takeovers compensate shareholders for their weak governance powers is undercut by the ability of management to deploy
defensive tactics warding off hostile bids.108 Bainbridge, who views
shareholder voting “not as an integral aspect of the corporate decisionmaking structure, but rather as an accountability device of last resort to
be used sparingly,”109 accepts limits on takeovers as a second-best solution necessary to the preservation of board authority in other contexts.110
This explanation, however, rests on elements of his director primacy
theory, and finds little support in existing law. Delaware case law clearly establishes that the legitimacy of board authority derives from election by the shareholders, rejecting the depiction of directors as “Platonic
masters.”111 This conceptualization of board authority—taken in combination with the authority at least to approve fundamental matters such as
charter amendments and mergers—tends to contradict the notion that
shareholder voting can be dismissed as a mere accountability device.
Additionally, all nexus-based theories, like the shareholder primacy
view, fail to explain the fact that U.S. corporate law does not mandate
shareholder wealth maximization as the defining aim of the corporation,112 and that it is in fact replete with structures permitting substantial
deviations from shareholders’ interests in an enormous range of circumstances.113 In this light, it should come as no shock that the Delaware Court of Chancery has recently rejected the notion that “freedom
of contract” constitutes the defining feature of Delaware corporations.114
The descriptive shortcomings of all three prevailing theories of the
U.S. public corporation are as substantial as they are inescapable. But
107. Id. at 37–39; see also Bainbridge, supra note 103, at 587–91.
108. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 205–06.
109. Bainbridge, supra note 72, at 627.
110. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31
DEL. J. CORP. L. 769, 827–28 (2006).
111. Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659, 663 (Del. Ch. 1988).
112. See Elhauge, supra note 90, at 738.
113. These points are ultimately conceded by nexus scholars. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK &
FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 205–06; Bainbridge, supra note 110, at 778 & n.43.
114. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar.
23, 2009).
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their normative thrust is, of course, another matter.115 In the concluding
Part of the Article, I will argue that the descriptive shortcomings of the
prevailing nexus theory, in particular, should be brought to bear on assessment of its normative claims, an argument that draws upon the
comparative analysis set out in the following Parts of the Article.

B.

The Shareholder-Centrism of U.K. Corporate Governance

In contrast with the position of shareholders in a U.S. public corporation, U.K. shareholders possess substantial powers to intervene directly
in corporate governance, and benefit from directors’ duties and a conception of corporate purpose focusing far more intently on their interests. (For the sake of clarity, the contrasts discussed below are summarized in Figure 1.) The result is a decidedly shareholder-centric
governance system exhibiting little of the ambivalence that characterizes U.S. corporate governance.116

115. See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 100, at 32 (“[M]ost contractarians probably regard the
normative story as being the more important of the two.”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note
17, at 15.
116. Some measures suggest that a higher level of shareholder protection prevails in the United States. For example, Gourevitch and Shinn place the United States at the top of their list, with
the United Kingdom a few places behind. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 48. However,
their broad measure of shareholder protections includes not only control rights, but also disclosure requirements, board independence, and incentive compensation. Moreover, their definition
of “control” is a narrow one (borrowed from La Porta et al., supra note 1) that assigns the same
score to both countries. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 42–48. They do note, however,
that “in the judgment of many observers [the United Kingdom] has better shareholder protections
in practice than the United States.” Id. at 259.
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FIGURE 1: SHAREHOLDERS’ DEFAULT POWERS AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES
IN PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
U.S. (Del.)
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Unlike in the United States, shareholders in a U.K. public corporation117 can, under the Companies Act (2006), unilaterally amend the
company’s constitution (its core governance document)118 by special
resolution of a seventy-five percent majority.119 This differs enormously
from the Delaware approach, which permits the board to play a gatekeeping role by requiring that any change to the charter be proposed by
the board before the shareholders may approve it. Additionally, U.K.
shareholders possess far greater capacity to replace directors. Shareholders representing five percent voting power can demand a meeting,
at which directors can be removed by ordinary resolution of a simple
majority.120 It should also be noted that U.K. shareholders do not en117. I refer to “public companies” for ease of reference. I in fact mean the “public limited
company,” or “plc,” as opposed to the “private limited company,” or “ltd.” Public limited companies may offer securities to the public, but they are subject to more onerous regulation—notably,
the requirement that a “trading certificate” be obtained before doing business and that “the nominal value of the company’s allotted share capital” be at least £50,000 (or the “euro equivalent”). Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 4, 755–756, 761–763 (U.K.).
118. The company’s constitution includes its “articles,” together with certain resolutions and
agreements. Id. § 17. The articles set out “regulations for the company,” though “model articles”
prescribed by the Secretary of State apply by default. Id. §§ 18–20.
119. Id. §§ 21(1), 283.
120. Id. §§ 168, 282, 303–304; The Companies (Shareholders’ Rights) Regulations, 2009, S.I.
2009/1632, ¶ 4 (U.K.) (lowering the requirement from ten to five percent). This removal power
applies “notwithstanding anything in any agreement” between the corporation and the director, id.
§ 168(1), but the director “is entitled to be heard on the resolution at the meeting.” Id. § 169. For
a historical overview of shareholder governance in U.K. company law, see R.C. Nolan, The Con-
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counter the sorts of regulatory impediments to coordinated action that
U.S. securities regulation imposes.121
As in the United States, the model articles that apply to U.K. public
companies by default122 state that generally “the directors are responsible for the management of the company’s business, for which purpose
they may exercise all the powers of the company.”123 Thus, as in U.S.
corporations, the board is clearly “the most important decision-making
body within the company.”124 However, there is a critical difference: the
model articles permit U.K. shareholders literally to “direct the directors,” by special resolution, “to take, or refrain from taking, specified
action.”125 This notion of directing the directors is utterly foreign to Delaware law and, at least in theory, would appear to give the shareholders
a very strong card to play in discussions with management.
As a practical matter, the removal power, which requires only an ordinary resolution, is far more significant. As Paul Davies observes, “the
disgruntled shareholders can say, in effect, to the directors: if you
choose not to follow our views, we will by ordinary majority seek to
remove you from office”—a “powerful inducement” to follow the
shareholders’ wishes.126 In general, British institutional shareholders
have been content to leave governance entirely to the board, but when
trouble arises, the removal power gives them tremendous leverage in
discussions with management over the future of the company.127 The
power to “direct the directors,” however, does remain significant at a
tinuing Evolution of Shareholder Governance, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 92, 98–115 (2006).
121. See Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure, supra note 8, at 1751–52; Gelter, supra note 1, at 188; see also supra note 87.
122. See supra note 118. On the typical content of listed company articles, see Nolan, supra
note 120, at 115–19. Nolan argues that the shareholders’ role in corporate governance should presumptively be left to private ordering through the articles, though he acknowledges that the issue
of corporate purpose is more inherently political. See id. at 120–25.
123. The Companies (Model Articles) Regulations, 2008, S.I. 2008/3229, art. 3, sched. 3
(U.K.) [hereinafter Model Articles].
124. PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES’ PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 365–
71 (8th ed. 2008); see also ALAN DIGNAM & JOHN LOWRY, COMPANY LAW 143–44, 265–68 (5th
ed. 2009).
125. Model Articles, supra note 123, art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
126. DAVIES, supra note 124, at 371. On the relationship between authority and accountability in organizational decision-making more generally, see KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF
ORGANIZATION 63–79 (1974).
127. See DAVIES, supra note 124, at 425. Davies speculates that increasing investment in
U.K. equities by institutions and hedge funds from other countries may result in more substantial
shareholder activism. See id. But see CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 382–404 (arguing that such developments “will not compromise the divorce of ownership and control that characterizes UK
corporate governance”).
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theoretical level, vividly illustrating that the board’s powers in a U.K.
corporation are fundamentally a matter of “private ordering.” U.K. directors’ powers emanate solely from “delegation via the articles and not
from a separate and free-standing grant of authority from the State,” a
fact that, in Davies’ view, “helps to underline the shareholder-centred
nature of British company law.”128
Even more significant and illuminating differences, however, emerge
in the area of takeover regulation. In the United Kingdom, a target company’s board is effectively sidelined in a hostile takeover. This stands in
stark contrast with Delaware’s elaborate system of fiduciary duty-based
tests, granting corporate boards substantial discretion to employ defensive measures to impede tender offers, as well as the more far-reaching
authority to do so under the constituency statutes enacted by numerous
other states. Indeed, takeovers in the United Kingdom are regulated only
in a qualified sense, because they are effectively overseen by the market
itself. The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (City Code) has, since
1968, been implemented by an independent body called the Panel on
Takeovers and Mergers (City Panel), which “draws its members from
major financial and business institutions,” including members nominated by the major organizations of insurers, investment companies,
pensions, banks, accountants, stockbrokers, and industry.129 Although
recently given a statutory mandate in order to comply with a European
Community directive,130 the City Panel in practice remains very much a
creature of the private sector.131
Whether a takeover bid succeeds or fails is, as a practical matter and
by regulatory design, left entirely to the shareholders. The City Code,
128. DAVIES, supra note 124, at 366–67.
129. The Takeover Panel: Panel Membership, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/
panel-membership (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); see The Takeover Panel: About the Panel,
http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/structure/about-the-panel (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); The
Takeover Panel: The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, http://www.thetakeoverpanel.org.uk/
index.php?page_id=45 (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
130. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 942–43 (U.K.) (recognizing the Panel as the authority responsible for implementing the EC takeover directive); Council Directive 2004/25/EC, art. 4,
2004 O.J. (L 142) (EC) (“Member States shall designate the authority or authorities competent to
supervise bids . . . .”). For additional background on European takeover regulation, see Marco
Ventoruzzo, Europe’s Thirteenth Directive and U.S. Takeover Regulation: Regulatory Means and
Political and Economic Ends, 41 TEX. INT’L L.J. 171 (2006).
131. See, e.g., JOHN BIRDS ET AL., BOYLE & BIRDS’ COMPANY LAW 788–89 (6th ed. 2007).
Though currently left to the private sector, the government could of course become more directly
involved in the future. The U.K.’s Financial Services Authority does possess authority to intervene in matters relating to takeovers, though it has traditionally declined to do so. See Brian E.
Rosenzweig, Note, Private Versus Public Regulation: A Comparative Analysis of British and
American Takeover Controls, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 213, 217–20 (2007).
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which consists of various principles and rules, states in clear terms that
as soon as a target board “has reason to believe that a bona fide offer
might be imminent,” it cannot “take any action which may result in any
offer or bona fide possible offer being frustrated or in shareholders being denied the opportunity to decide on its merits” without shareholder
approval.132 This central rule of U.K. takeover regulation is extraordinary from the American perspective, for its clarity as much as its shareholder-centrism: shareholders decide on the bid, end-stop. In fact, the
very purpose of this regime is to protect shareholders. As one former
Executive Director of the City Panel explained, the City Panel “has
nothing to say about the merits of an offer. It is almost solely the offeree
company’s shareholders whose interest the Code has at heart.”133
The City Code does include the so-called “mandatory offer” rule,
generally requiring that upon reaching thirty percent voting power a bid
must be made for all shares.134 One could imagine this requirement insulating incumbent management by increasing the cost of tender offers.135 It remains the case, however, that “takeover activity in general
(including friendly mergers) is more intense in the United Kingdom”
than in the United States.136 And, in any event, the clear intent of the
mandatory offer rule is to protect shareholders by permitting them to
cash out should they harbor “a low opinion of the new controller’s business ability or methods” and to receive part of the control premium.137
This discussion illustrates the shareholder-centrism of the U.K. system relative to the approach taken in the United States. While the U.S.
takeover regime reflects substantial doubts regarding the consistency of
shareholders’ interests and incentives with those of the larger public, the
U.K. takeover regime reflects no such misgivings. Indeed, this divergence holds true across the two countries’ corporate governance systems more generally. In addition to the substantial powers possessed by
132. THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE TAKEOVER CODE I18 (9th ed. 2009);
see also id. at B1.
133. T.P. Lee, Takeovers—the United Kingdom Experience, in TAKEOVERS, INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS, AND THE MODERNIZATION OF CORPORATE LAWS 192, 195 (John H. Farrar ed.,
1993).
134. See THE PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, supra note 132, at B1, F1.
135. See Ventoruzzo, supra note 130, at 192, 214.
136. Gelter, supra note 1, at 151. Armour and Skeel report that “an M&A transaction in the
United Kingdom is more likely to be hostile, and if hostile, is more likely to succeed,” but that
“the overall level of [U.S.] takeover activity, adjusted for the size of the economy, actually seems
slightly higher than in the United Kingdom.” Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1738–41. As Gelter observes, however, the data that Armour and Skeel report translate to a higher rate of U.K.
M&A activity relative to gross domestic product. Gelter, supra note 1, at 151 n.138.
137. Lee, supra note 133, at 198–99.
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U.K. shareholders to intervene in corporate affairs, and consistent with
the strongly shareholder-centric takeover regime, U.K. company law
has confirmed explicitly that the defining aim of the corporation is to
advance the interests of shareholders. While section 170 of the Companies Act establishes that duties are owed to the company itself138—a fact
that becomes significant in enforcing them139—section 172 requires that
a director “must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its
members [i.e., the shareholders] as a whole.”140 The provision does instruct the director to consider the interests of various stakeholder
groups, including employees, suppliers, customers, and the community.
Directors are also to consider larger issues including environmental impacts, the company’s business reputation, and the “long term” consequences of board decisions, naturally giving the board substantial room
to maneuver, just as in the United States.141 Ultimately, however, as a
formal matter, such considerations are relevant only to the extent that
they relate to the actual duty imposed on directors to make a good faith
effort to advance the shareholders’ interests.142 Notwithstanding the po138. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 170(1) (U.K.).
139. See DAVIES, supra note 124, at 479–80 (explaining that this formulation limits enforcement of directors’ duties to derivative litigation); DIGNAM & LOWRY, supra note 124, at 301.
140. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (U.K.) (emphasis added). On the status of investors as “members” of the company, see id. §§ 112–113.
141. Id. § 172(1). Section 172 reads in full:
Duty to promote the success of the company
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to—
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term,
(b) the interests of the company’s employees,
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers
and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of
business conduct, and
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company.
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or include
purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the benefit of its members were to
achieving those purposes.
(3) The duty imposed by this section has effect subject to any enactment or rule of
law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to consider or act in the interests of
creditors of the company.
142. See DAVIES, supra note 124, at 506–09; DIGNAM & LOWRY, supra note 124, at 311–18.
Section 309 of the 1985 Companies Act required directors to have regard for the interests of employees, but this provision was not enforceable by the employees themselves. The 2006 revisions
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litical nod to other stakeholders and issues of larger social interest, the
core duty articulated in section 172 is clear, reflecting none of the ambivalence that continues to characterize the prevailing formulation of a
U.S. director’s fiduciary duties.
One might fairly ask whether the far greater capacity of U.S. shareholders to sue, either derivatively under corporate law or through a direct class action, narrows the gap in shareholder orientation between
U.S. and U.K. corporate governance described above.143 To be sure, the
shareholder suit is a far more developed means of enforcement in the
United States than elsewhere.144 As a matter of U.K. company law, the
fact that directors’ duties are owed to the company alone, the restrictive
rules on derivative standing, and the subjective nature of the directors’
duty to pursue shareholders’ interests (requiring only “good faith” effort), combine to render it quite difficult for U.K. shareholders to bring
suit.145 The notion that greater capacity to sue in the United States might
tend to focus management more intently on the shareholders’ interests
certainly has intuitive appeal, but ultimately it remains a matter of speculation. For example, James Cox and Randall Thomas, in a review of
studies on U.S. securities litigation, attribute the paucity of empirical research on the deterrence value of private suits to the difficulty of assessing how the world might look in their absence. The degree to which governance is improved, from the shareholders’ perspective, “out of fear
of the securities class action is at best speculative and indeterminate
and, hence, beyond the empiricists’ reach.”146 Likewise, establishing
sought to eliminate confusion by repealing this provision and clarifying that regard for employee
interests is relevant solely in connection with the pursuit of shareholders’ interests. See id. at 315–
16.
143. See, e.g., ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 369–422; STEPHEN J. CHOI & A.C. PRITCHARD,
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND ANALYSIS 238–350, 492–566 (2d ed. 2008). On the nature
of derivative suits, see supra text accompanying note 71.
144. See, e.g., Eilís Ferran, Are US-Style Investor Suits Coming to the UK?, 9 J. CORP. L.
STUD. 315, 339–40 (2009); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Mapping the American Shareholder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. Securities Law 2 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 09-10, 2009; Duke
Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 246, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1370508.
145. See BIRDS ET AL., supra note 131, at 674–77; DAVIES, supra note 124, at 480–82, 507–
10, 614–27; DIGNAM & LOWRY, supra note 124, at 187–90, 301–02, 312. In fact, the Companies
Act even contains a provision permitting a court to relieve any liability for breach of duty, “on
such terms as . . . the judge may think proper,” where the court concludes that the individual
“acted honestly and reasonably, and that having regard to all the circumstances . . . he ought fairly
to be excused.” Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 1157 (U.K.); see also Ferran, supra note 144, at
342 (discussing impediments to private U.K. securities suits).
146. Cox & Thomas, supra note 144, at 20.
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that securities suits actually cause improvements in corporate governance to be made “may prove very difficult.”147 Indeed, even if such
questions were more amenable to empirical research, applying any such
findings to the issue of corporate purpose would presumably require
weighing fears of shareholder litigation against fears of other forms of
litigation by employees and creditors, introducing further complexity
into the analysis.148 What is clear, however, is that U.K. shareholders’
ability to threaten removal of directors who fail to adhere to their wishes
vastly eclipses any direct powers over corporate governance possessed
by U.S. shareholders, which may itself explain the limited reliance on
litigation in the United Kingdom. As Eilís Ferran suggests, “the [U.K.]
investor community is dominated by sophisticated institutions that are
accustomed to exerting influence via informal, reputational and market
mechanisms underpinned by governance rights conferred by company
law and which do not (yet?) regard private litigation as an important
control tool.”149
Overall, it would appear that the U.K. corporate governance system is
substantially more compatible with theories emphasizing shareholders’
interests than the U.S. corporate governance system is. In particular, the
U.K. approach would appear broadly compatible with the nexus view of
the corporation. The default corporate governance arrangement resembles the nexus corporation in granting relatively broad managerial authority to a board elected by the shareholders. This mode of accountability is bolstered by the clarity of the board’s duty to shareholders under
section 172, as well as by the U.K.’s relatively unfettered market for
corporate control.150 Moreover, the Companies Act explicitly characte147. Id. at 38; see also Andrew S. Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule: Reflections on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV. 398,
453 & n.333 (2007).
148. Indeed, in the Revlon case discussed above, part of what the shareholders found objectionable about the lock-up agreement with the target board’s preferred bidder was that part of the
value received in the sale of the company would take the form of a promise to support the value
of previously issued notes. This was prompted by the target board’s fear of litigation by the noteholders, who would otherwise be hurt by the leveraged structure of the deal. See Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178–79, 182–83 (Del. 1986); see also supra
note 81 and accompanying text.
149. Ferran, supra note 144, at 342–44. Ferran observes that the restrictive U.K. civil liability
regime in the securities context reflects the view that U.S. shareholder litigation is “wastefully
circular, involving a wealth transfer from one group of shareholders (those who happen to own
the company at the time when the claim is brought) to another (the victims of the wrongdoing).”
Id. at 340.
150. By the same token, however, nexus scholars would have a difficult time explaining U.K.
shareholders’ extraordinary power to intervene directly in corporate affairs. See supra notes 102–
05 and accompanying text.
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rizes the corporation as contractual in nature, stating that the company’s
constitution “bind[s] the company and its members to the same extent as
if there were covenants on the part of the company and of each member
to observe those provisions.”151 Whether the nexus theory can, in fact,
be said to provide a compelling description of U.K. corporate governance is questioned below,152 but there is certainly evidence that the
nexus view carries some sway among scholars and practitioners in the
United Kingdom. The steering group for the comprehensive company
law review that culminated in the 2006 Companies Act even stated in a
consultation document that this structure “serves the interests of shareholders by conferring on them ultimate control of the undertaking,” citing Easterbrook and Fischel’s The Economic Structure of Corporate
Law for “economic justification.”153
As this overview of U.S. and U.K. corporate governance demonstrates, the “Anglo-American” corporation is, at best, a stylized fact. As
such, its utility in global comparative analysis comes at a cost: a lack of
nuance that obscures the substantial and fundamental differences that
emerge on closer analysis.154 The next Part of this Article aims to illuminate why the substantial divergences described above have arisen between two corporate governance systems that appear so similar from the
global perspective.

III. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN POLITICAL CONTEXT
Tackling why the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems diverge on the fundamental issue of corporate purpose requires engaging
with the substantial literature addressing a related though distinct subject: how, when, and why ownership dispersal occurred in the United
States and the United Kingdom, respectively. As discussed below, the
protection of minority shareholder interests has been identified as a critical factor in the dispersal of ownership in these systems. Such protections are thought to enhance the willingness of investors to part with
151. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 33(1) (U.K.); see also BIRDS ET AL., supra note 131, at
145–53. Note, however, that while this provision “uses the language of contract,” it is a contract
“of a special kind” in that, among other things, it arises by statute rather than by bargain, and it
can be altered by special resolution of the shareholders alone. See id. at 146.
152. See infra Part IV.
153. COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A
COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: THE STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 34 (1999) [hereinafter STRATEGIC
FRAMEWORK].
154. A “stylized fact” is a “broad generalization, true in essence, though perhaps not in detail.” GRAHAM BANNOCK ET AL., DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 370 (4th ed. 2003).
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their money on favorable terms, notwithstanding the practical difficulties that minority investors face in seeking to influence corporate affairs.
The manner in which this process has unfolded in each country has undoubtedly had critical consequences for the development of their corporate governance structures and the relative position of shareholders
within them. In this Part of the Article, I respond to this literature by describing the degree to which such developments have been reinforced
by larger political trends in each country, including the degree of support for non-shareholders outside the corporate governance system.
Contrary to prevailing theories on the role of politics in the emergence of these corporate governance structures, I argue that left-leaning
politics and the construction of the post-war welfare state in the United
Kingdom actually facilitated the emergence of shareholder-oriented
structures within its corporate governance system by deflecting stakeholder-oriented political pressures that might otherwise have been directed toward the corporate structure itself. Conversely, I argue, the reliance on private employers in the United States to provide the sorts of
social welfare protections provided by government in the United Kingdom resulted in stakeholder-oriented political pressures being focused
on the corporate structure itself, inhibiting the development of a strongly shareholder-centric corporate governance system in the United States.
As I argue in this Part of the Article, once ownership dispersal has substantially occurred within a given country, left-leaning politics may actually facilitate a higher degree of shareholder-centrism within its corporate governance system.

A.

Politics and the Formation of Corporate Governance Systems

In a highly influential series of papers, Rafael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny—economists
who have been referred to collectively as LLSV—theorized that legal
protection of minority shareholders against exploitation by managers
and controllers is a prerequisite to ownership dispersal, and that the
quality of such protections relates critically to the general orientation of
the legal system within a given country.155 In particular, common law
systems such as the United States and the United Kingdom were found
to provide stronger minority shareholder protections than civil law sys-

155. See La Porta et al., supra note 1; La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra note 4; La Porta et al., Law and Finance, supra note 4; La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 4.
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tems,156 suggesting that the emergence of a dispersed ownership system
or a concentrated ownership system in a given country was literally “a
consequence” of one or the other preexisting legal orientation.157
This “law matters” theory, as it has come to be called,158 has been
hotly disputed and largely discredited in its literal form. As discussed
above, the United States and the United Kingdom are the quintessential
dispersed ownership systems, yet detailed historical accounts of ownership dispersal in each country demonstrate that strong shareholder protections did not achieve recognition in law until after dispersal had substantially occurred. These accounts demonstrate that while safeguarding
minority interests was indeed important, the operative protections in
both countries initially emerged out of private ordering, prompted particularly by the desire of financial firms and stock exchanges to develop
and preserve good reputations with investors.159 “Legal reforms,” John
Coffee concludes, “are enacted at the behest of a motivated constituency
that will be protected,” but “the constituency (here, dispersed public
shareholders) must first arise before it can become an effective lobbying
force and an instrument of legal change.”160 Additionally, politically
156. See La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, supra note 4.
157. See, e.g., La Porta et al., supra note 1, at 511–12. The authors attribute this difference to
the state’s “relatively greater role in regulating business in civil law countries than in common
law ones,” and note that “common law evolved to protect private property,” including that of investors, “against the crown.” La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 12.
158. See, e.g., Armour et al., Corporate Ownership Structure, supra note 8, at 1713; Cheffins,
supra note 4, at 462.
159. See, e.g., Cheffins, supra note 4, at 466–76; Brian R. Cheffins, Law as Bedrock: The
Foundations of an Economy Dominated by Widely Held Public Companies, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 7–12 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 25–44 (2001). Brian
Cheffins has further emphasized the capacity for dividend policy to act as a minority shareholderprotective device in the absence of strong legal protections—notably as a signal of health in the
absence of legally mandated financial disclosures, and as a means of limiting self-dealing and
“the squandering of corporate assets by those running public companies.” Brian R. Cheffins, Dividends as a Substitute for Corporate Law: The Separation of Ownership and Control in the United Kingdom, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1273, 1302 (2006).
160. Coffee, supra note 159, at 7. Coffee concludes that this correction of the historical sequencing suggests a “reinterpretation” of LLSV’s work to the effect that, while shareholder protections permitting ownership dispersal can arise outside law, formal legal protections are required to optimize those protections and stabilize capital markets. Id. at 65–66. In a later paper,
LLSV take an expansive view of “law” as including “stock exchange regulations and accounting
standards,” and envision enforcement not only by the state but also by “market participants themselves,” perhaps in response to such criticisms. See La Porta et al., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, supra note 4, at 7; see also Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 1, at 154; Millon,
supra note 48, at 911. The difficulty of measuring and assessing the quality of shareholder protections across disparate jurisdictions has also been emphasized. See, e.g., ROE, supra note 11, at
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oriented theorists have observed that the focus on a country’s legal family, an established historical fact, cannot explain why that country’s corporate governance system would evolve over time.161
The insight that one must look beyond formal law to explain the
emergence of ownership dispersal indicates the importance not only of
considering market-based substitutes for law but also of considering
how broader societal politics may condition the laws and regulatory
structures that ultimately take shape. One of the most influential efforts
in this vein has been Mark Roe’s social democracy theory, which associates the persistence of blockholding with broader social democratic
policies, and ownership dispersal with deviation from such policies.162
Roe defines “social democracies” to include “nations committed to private property but whose governments play a large role in the economy,
emphasize distributional considerations, and favor employees over capital-owners when the two conflict”163—policy positions associated with
the political left.164 Ultimately, Roe posits two equilibria: the first “has
weakly competitive markets fitting with social democratic politics and
concentrated ownership,” and the second “matches fiercely competitive
markets, conservative almost laissez-faire politics, and diffuse ownership.”165
Roe’s principal comparison is between Europe and the United
States,166 an approach that tends to lend support to his theory. For example, the fact that blockholding prevails in Germany, where the codetermination system provides substantial board-level representation for
employees, would seem to support the theory that pro-labor policies impede ownership dispersal by rendering the corporation less directly res183–85.
161. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 86–87; Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin,
The Political Economy of Corporate Governance, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1005, 1005–06 (2005);
Pagano & Volpin, supra note 8, at 504–06; Rajan & Zingales, supra note 50, at 7, 14, 42–43. For
a critique of LLSV’s work in the economic development context, see Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, supra note 37, at 165 (concluding that “the way the law was
initially transplanted and received is a more important determinant [of effective legal institutions]
than the supply of law from a particular legal family”).
162. ROE, supra note 11, at 2–3.
163. Id. at 24.
164. See id. at 3.
165. Id. at 6. As Peter Gourevitch observes, “Roe’s treatment resonates strongly with the ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ literature,” which similarly contrasts “coordinated market economies” and
“liberal market economies.” See Peter A. Gourevitch, The Politics of Corporate Governance
Regulation, 112 YALE L.J. 1829, 1842, 1855 (2003) (reviewing ROE, supra note 11).
166. See ROE, supra note 11, at 4, 16 (contrasting concentrated ownership and high levels of
labor participation in corporate governance in Europe with diffuse ownership and low labor participation in the United States).
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ponsive to shareholders’ interests.167 But in the United States, Roe explains, where distrust of large financial institutions resulted in
ry structures fragmenting them, social democracy never really took root
for lack of “visible targets.” As a result, “norms like shareholder-wealth
maximization flourished more easily than they otherwise would have,”
permitting widely held public corporations to emerge and thrive.168 This
likewise would seem to support the theory by associating shareholdercentric institutions and ownership dispersal with the relative absence of
social democratic policies.169
Roe’s theory founders, however, when he turns to the United Kingdom. Specifically, the United Kingdom raises two problems for Roe.
First, the United Kingdom does not conform to the theory because it appears to have made the transition to dispersed ownership during a period
of British history in which social democratic policies prevailed—
including in tax, labor, and industrial policy.170 Second, while Roe’s
theory can describe the position of either the United States or the United
Kingdom on the left-right spectrum relative to other countries, it cannot
explain their positions relative to each other since, as discussed above,
the more left-leaning country proves also to be substantially more
shareholder-oriented in outlook.
While it is relatively clear that ownership dispersal had occurred in
the United States by the 1930s,171 the timing of ownership dispersal in
the United Kingdom has been a matter of some controversy. Roe acknowledges that “[t]he United Kingdom would seem the hardest case
for the political theory,” given the social democratic leaning of British
politics following World War II, but he argues nevertheless that U.K.
167. See id. at 71–82.
168. Id. at 104–05.
169. Roe marshals data supporting the association of ownership patterns with left-right politics based on “a poll of political scientists from around the world.” Id. at 49.
170. See CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 46–51; Cheffins, supra note 1, at 32–34; Coffee, supra
note 159, at 39–40. Cheffins further observes, conversely, that ownership dispersal did not occur
in the early twentieth century, when the United Kingdom tended not to pursue social democratic
policies. See Cheffins, supra note 1, at 30–31.
171. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932); see also Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Law and Ownership Structure: A Darwinian Link?, 25 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 346, 347 (2002); Coffee, supra note 159, at
24–25. While a recent paper reports that U.S. public companies in fact typically have substantial
shareholders, a low threshold of just five percent ownership is employed. Compare Clifford G.
Holderness, The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 1377
(2009), with Brian R. Cheffins & Steven A. Bank, Is Berle and Means Really a Myth? (UCLA
School of Law, Law-Econ Research Paper No. 09-05, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1352605.
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securities markets only “flourished when Britain moved rightward” following Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power in 1979.172 Historians have
dated ownership dispersal in the United Kingdom from as early as the
1950s to as late as the 1980s, straddling the line between periods of social democracy and right-leaning politics, respectively.173 The best
available evidence, however, tends to suggest that dispersed ownership
in fact took root in the United Kingdom before the 1980s, casting doubt
on Roe’s theory. A recent and exhaustive treatment of the available data
by Brian Cheffins indicates that whereas in the early 1950s large U.K.
companies still tended to be controlled by families (via stock ownership
and board positions), by the 1970s blockholding (i.e. ownership of substantial blocks of stock) “had become the exception to the rule.”174
Observing the problems that Roe’s theory encounters, others have
engaged in less parsimonious but more nuanced analyses highlighting
the variety of economic and financial factors that contributed to the
emergence of ownership dispersal and shareholder-centric regulatory
structures in mid-twentieth century Britain. One notable factor was the
rise of institutional shareholders capable of exerting substantial dominance in politics and the marketplace. Unlike in the United States, where
populist banking and securities regulatory reforms enacted in the 1930s
tended to constrain and marginalize institutions,175 and where institutional investors would achieve their current degree of prominence only
in the 1990s,176 in the United Kingdom, individuals “became persistent
net sellers of equity” following World War II, and “[p]ension funds and
insurance companies largely filled the gap.”177 While the causes are
172. ROE, supra note 11, at 98–103.
173. See Brian R. Cheffins, Law, Economics and the UK’s System of Corporate Governance:
Lessons from History, 1 J. CORP. L. STUD. 71, 80–84 (2001). Cheffins notes “an unfortunate data
gap” during the 1950s and 1960s, rendering it difficult to say whether ownership of British companies was substantially dispersed during this period. CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 11–17.
174. See CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 304–07. While dispersed ownership had emerged in certain U.K. industries by 1914—notably railroads, banking, and insurance—such industries remained exceptional. See id. at 221–51.
175. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994); see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 243–
45; Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1751–52; Pagano & Volpin, supra note 8, at 512 (citing the
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the Securities Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
176. Institutional ownership began to accelerate in the 1970s and 1980s. For a discussion of
the rise of U.S. institutional shareholders, see Bruner, supra note 6, at 1432–35; see also Armour
& Skeel, supra note 1, at 1767–68.
177. CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 87; see also Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1767–68. In a
recent paper, John Armour and Jeffrey Gordon argue that these historical differences resulted in
strikingly different regulatory approaches. The U.S. bias against institutions resulted in use of the
passive “retail investor as its regulatory heuristic,” leading in turn to an emphasis on disclosure
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numerous and complex, the institutions’ earlier rise to prominence in
the United Kingdom has been aptly described as “an unintended consequence of various legislative measures that had the effect of actively
promoting their ownership of stock.”178 Of critical importance was the
fact that while individuals’ investment income was taxed at very high
rates following World War II (until Thatcher rose to power), insurance
companies were taxed at a much lower rate, and pension funds were literally exempt from taxes on investment income until 1997.179 High individual dividend tax rates, along with high income tax and estate tax
rates for the affluent, gave family blockholders strong incentives to sell
their shares, with institutions prepared to buy.180
These historical developments offer important insights into the emergence of starkly shareholder-centric corporate governance structures in
the United Kingdom. With respect to takeover regulation, for example,
John Armour and David Skeel have observed that the effort to fragment
financial power in the United States short-circuited self-regulatory efforts, leaving the regulation of takeovers primarily to state courts. This
development, they suggest, may have created “a structural bias in favor
of the directors,” who would naturally argue that they “need to resist the
unwanted takeover in order to preserve order and stability.”181 In the
United Kingdom, by contrast, a self-regulatory approach focusing intently, if not exclusively, on shareholders’ interests reflected the dominance of institutional shareholders.182 “In a range of different contexts,”
Armour and Skeel observe, “U.K. institutional investors have been active either in lobbying regulators or in seeding market norms,” and given their “clear interest in rules that maximize expected gains to shareholders, it is not surprising that the emergence of a pro-shareholder
approach to takeover regulation coincided with the emergence of institutional investors as a significant force in British share ownership.”183 In
coupled with “aggressive enforcement,” but weak governance powers. The U.K. facilitation of
institutional investment, on the other hand, led to stronger governance powers but less reliance on
disclosure rules. See John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Berle-Means Corporation in the 21st
Century 3–4 (2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
178. Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1768.
179. Id. at 1768–69; see also CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 341–49.
180. See CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 323–28, 345–46.
181. Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1781–84.
182. See id. at 1756–64, 1771–72.
183. Id. at 1771. The explanatory power of this divergence in regulatory approaches is reinforced by the fact that takeover cases litigated in U.K. courts by the time the Takeover Panel had
established itself “bear a striking resemblance to several of the leading Delaware takeover decisions,” exhibiting relatively greater tolerance for target board defensive measures. Id. at 1782–83.
For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical
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both the United States and the United Kingdom, they conclude “the regulatory mode was the largely unintended consequence of regulation designed to achieve other objectives.”184
That said, however, the institutional explanation for the greater
shareholder-centrism of U.K. corporate governance leaves some vexing
questions unanswered. One can readily accept that shareholders left to
regulate themselves will likely adopt shareholder-centric rules, and yet
reasonably suspect that such a regime could only endure if that outcome
were compatible with prevailing views regarding broader social interests. Put differently, explaining an institution’s origin is one thing, but
explaining its persistence is another.185 As Roe aptly observes, “[b]efore
a nation can produce, it must achieve social peace,” a larger goal to
which corporate governance must respond in different ways in different
countries.186 A corporate governance system that is incompatible with
the prevailing politics will eventually lead to one form of “backlash” or
another. “Corporate structures,” Roe suggests, are “resolved continually, not sequentially, with some packages more stable than others.”187
Other theorists have looked to politics in search of an explanation for
why corporate governance systems persist or change over time, and why
they vary from country to country. Like Roe, however, these theorists
have tended to take a global approach, lumping the United States and
the United Kingdom together and thus providing only limited insight into why these particular countries diverge as they do. The varieties of capitalism (VOC) approach, for example, usefully places corporate governance within the broader context of various “spheres in which firms
must develop relationships to resolve coordination problems central to
their core competencies,” including industrial relations, vocational training, relationships with other companies (e.g., customers and suppliers),
and, of course, coordinating with employees.188 VOC scholars, however, posit just two equilibria for managing these coordination problems:
the so-called “coordinated market economies,” where companies rely on
cooperative non-market coordination mechanisms to incentivize firmspecific investment, and so-called “liberal market economies,” such as
the United States and the United Kingdom, where companies interact
and Theoretical Perspectives on the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422, 436–41 (2007).
184. Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1784.
185. See Hall & Soskice, supra note 2, at 13–14.
186. ROE, supra note 11, at 1.
187. Id. at 120; see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 3; Peter A. Hall & Kathleen
Thelen, Institutional Change in Varieties of Capitalism, 7 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 7, 11–15 (2009).
188. Hall & Soskice, supra note 2, at 6–7.
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through competitive market-based exchanges, favoring shareholder interests and labor market flexibility.189 Like Roe’s theory, this framework is useful in comparing either the United States or the United
Kingdom with other countries, but does not offer a straightforward
means of distinguishing between them.
Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, building on the VOC framework190 and likewise aiming for global explanatory power,191 posit a similarly limited range of potential outcomes. For Gourevitch and Shinn,
corporate governance and ownership structure are functions of how
shareholders, managers, and employees pursue their varying preferences
through the political structures prevailing in a given country and, particularly, how coalitions among them are formed.192 Alignments are conceptualized in terms of three “cleavages,” each isolating one group:
“class conflict,” which isolates employees; “sectoral,” which isolates
shareholders; and “property and voice,” which aligns shareholders with
workers via growing pension fund investment, isolating management.193
In this schema, the United States and the United Kingdom are examined
through the “property and voice” conceptual lens. Gourevitch and Shinn
emphasize the efforts of institutional shareholders (including pensions)
to advance corporate governance reforms and explain their greater success in the United Kingdom by reference to the strongly majoritarian
political structure. This structure, they argue, permits faster policy shifts
than in the United States, where the fragmented governmental structure
provides more points of entry for managers aiming to impede such
reform efforts.194
Like the Roe and VOC theories, however, this framework does not
permit a compelling explanation for the points of divergence explored
here. The U.S. legal response to hostile takeovers is primarily characterized by Gourevitch and Shinn as management entrenchment,195 leaving
189. Id. at 8–10, 19–20, 24–30; see also Gourevitch, supra note 165, at 1842; Hall & Thelen,
supra note 187, at 9–11.
190. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 11, 53 (incorporating the VOC concept of
“institutional complementarity”); Hall & Thelen, supra note 187, at 8, 25 (citing criticisms of the
VOC approach as “overly static” in its focus on two equilibria and suggesting that the coalition
approach may enhance its ability to explain change).
191. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 277.
192. Id. at 8–9. For similar investigations of the role of political coalitions in corporate governance, see Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, Managers, Workers, and Corporate Control, 60
J. FIN. 841 (2005); Pagano & Volpin, supra note 161; Pagano & Volpin, supra note 8.
193. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 59–62.
194. Id. at 241–62. For data reflecting increasing equity ownership by U.S. and U.K. workers
through pension funds, see id. at 224 & tbl. 7.4.
195. See id. at 250–54.
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unexplored the degree to which a coalition of management and labor
formed to the exclusion of shareholders.196 Similarly, the greater success of U.K. shareholders vis-à-vis management is explained primarily
as a failure of managers to get their way in a strongly majoritarian political structure,197 leaving unexplored the fact that shareholder-centric
U.K. regulatory structures largely took shape during the left-leaning
years between World War II and 1979—a period that also saw the coalescence of a substantial welfare state.198 Perhaps these points of emphasis reflect the fact that both resistance to hostile takeovers and the construction of a welfare state are elsewhere associated with successful
alignment of management and employees to the exclusion of shareholders—a state of affairs that the Gourevitch and Shinn schema predicts
should result in corporatism and blockholding.199 In any event, while the
stakeholder alignments and the differences in the two countries’ political systems that they emphasize may well illuminate important dimensions of their respective corporate governance systems, the rigidity of
the framework, presumably stemming from the pursuit of global explanatory power, undercuts its ability to provide a full explanation for the
substantial divergences discussed here.200
All of this said, however, these theories do advance important insights that are critical to explaining the divergences between U.S. and
U.K. corporate governance. First and foremost, Gourevitch and Shinn,
Roe, and the VOC literature all emphasize the centrality of politics in
the formation of corporate governance systems, and that the corporate
governance system itself can only be fully understood by reference to a
larger set of regulatory structures—particularly employment-related
196. Gourevitch and Shinn themselves emphasize that employees part ways with shareholders
in the context of hostile takeovers, where employees prefer management latitude “to factor in the
consequences on employment.” Id. at 222–23; see also Pagano & Volpin, supra note 8, at 506,
510. See generally Pagano & Volpin, supra note 192.
197. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 261–62.
198. See infra Part III.B.
199. See GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 149. Gourevitch and Shinn find that corporatism—“the inclusion of economic and social groups in the process of policy formation”—is
associated with ownership concentration and weaker shareholder protections in their overall sample. Id. at 157–58; see also Pagano & Volpin, supra note 8, at 508–10.
200. Pagano and Volpin encounter a similar though more substantial problem by simply
lumping together the United States and the United Kingdom as “majoritarian” systems, which are
expected to produce “strong shareholder protection and weak employment protection.” See Pagano & Volpin, supra note 161, at 1007, 1018–20, 1027. This categorization provides no
straightforward means of explaining the fact that the United Kingdom in fact exhibits both
stronger shareholder protections and stronger employment protections than the United States. See
infra Parts III.B–C.
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structures—that condition relationships among corporate stakeholders.
The notion of “institutional complementarity” employed by Gourevitch
and Shinn and the VOC literature—broadly, the relationship and degree
of fit between various forms of regulation—figures prominently in the
argument developed below.
I part ways with all of these theorists, however, in suggesting that the
manner in which these various regulatory structures interact with the
corporate governance system may change in a fundamental way once
substantial dispersal of ownership has already occurred in a given country. While left-leaning, stakeholder-oriented regulatory structures may
correlate with weaker shareholder orientation in the corporate governance system where concentrated ownership remains the norm, the U.S.
and U.K. developments discussed below suggest that, once dispersed
ownership is established, the correlation may actually reverse. Put differently, while shareholder protection devices may be critical to the emergence of dispersed ownership, stakeholder protection devices may be
critical to its maintenance. Moreover, the form that those stakeholder
protection devices take may have an enormous impact on the degree of
shareholder orientation exhibited by a country’s corporate governance
system.

B.

Shareholders and Stakeholders in the United Kingdom

In this Section, I argue that placing corporate governance within its
broader political context is critical to understanding both the origin and
persistence of shareholder-centric regulatory structures in the United
Kingdom. Specifically, I argue that left-leaning social democratic structures are not only compatible with shareholder-centrism, but that the
stark form of shareholder-centrism embraced in U.K. corporate governance could only have taken root in tandem with social democratic policies serving to deflect political pressures by lowering the stakes of corporate governance for non-shareholder groups.

1.

The British Welfare State

Perhaps ironically, a balance of internal and external forces is implicitly recognized by nexus theorists who argue that stakeholders’ interests are best addressed through external contracts and regulation. Yet,
these theorists routinely fail to recognize the degree to which shareholder-centric corporate governance and external stakeholder protections interrelate. Nexus scholars portray the position of shareholders’ interests
in corporate governance as fundamental and primary; external stake-
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holder protections are either assumed to be sufficient,201 or the consequences of their insufficiency for corporate governance itself are left
unexplored.202 In reality, as the evolution of U.K. corporate governance
illustrates, both internal and external structures have continually responded to one another in a dynamic process, and it is only by reference
to such a process that one can fully explain the strong association of the
U.K.’s shareholder-centric corporate governance structures with social
democratic policies and Labour Party politics.
Martin Gelter has similarly argued that shareholder-centrism and extra-corporate stakeholder protections are intrinsically related, but concludes that preexisting ownership structures in a given country will determine which legal structures are ultimately adopted.203 Gelter observes
that “stronger shareholder influence”—including through Europeanstyle blockholding, as opposed to greater formal governance authority
as a matter of corporate law—“implies a greater risk of expropriation
for stakeholders, such as employees.”204 In Europe this problem has
been addressed through stakeholder-oriented directors’ duties, employee
governance powers (for example, co-determination), and restrictive employment law rendering it “difficult and costly to lay off workers, thus
eliminating potential threats that can result in holdup-type renegotiations.”205 In the U.S. context, on the other hand, this problem has been
addressed through broad managerial discretion to deviate from shareholders’ interests.206 The United Kingdom, then, is treated as an “intermediate” case, with shareholder influence greater than one finds in the
United States but weaker than that of a blockholder, and employment
protections likewise falling somewhere between the weaker U.S. protections and the stronger European protections.207
Ultimately, Gelter argues that in each case the prevailing ownership
structure predated the arrival of employment legislation, the stakeholder
protection on which he focuses.208 Gelter concedes, however, that this is
hardly surprising in Europe, as “one could speak of concentrated owner201. See supra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. For discussions of this analytical weakness, see, for example, Millon, supra note 11, at 987–88, 1022–40; Millon, supra note 8, at 47;
Parkinson, supra note 12, at 43–44.
202. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439, 442, 449 (2000).
203. See Gelter, supra note 1, at 132–35, 181–86.
204. Id. at 144.
205. Id. at 168–76; cf. Belloc & Pagano, supra note 13.
206. Gelter, supra note 1, at 148–54.
207. Id. at 186–93.
208. Id. at 181–84, 188–93.
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ship as the primeval state of any corporate governance system,” and that
“it is not the persistence of concentrated ownership, but rather its unraveling in the United States and the United Kingdom that calls for an
explanation.”209 In these dispersed ownership systems, however, I argue
that we have to look beyond the employment law protections that Gelter
considers for a full explanation of the varying degrees of shareholdercentrism that they exhibit. Another form of stakeholder protection actually co-evolved with the U.K.’s starkly shareholder-centric corporate
governance structures—welfare state protections. In fact, these extracorporate stakeholder protections arguably preceded the emergence of
the relevant corporate governance structures. To this extent, the welfare
state might be aptly characterized as a form of what David Millon has
called “precontractual” state action—independent state action that conditions how various corporate stakeholders conceptualize their interests
and negotiate their claims upon the corporation.210
As the Economist has explained,
Britons are an incoherent lot. Convinced of their Anglo-Saxon
tight-fistedness, left-wing politicians have felt obliged to moderate or camouflage their egalitarian urges. Free-marketeers,
meanwhile, moan that the British are at bottom soggy socialists.
Both are right: British voters are willing to tolerate greater inequalities than many Europeans, but are stubbornly attached to a
few totems of communitarianism.211
In addition to the institutional factors discussed above, a full explanation of the degree of shareholder-centrism exhibited by the U.K. corporate governance system requires examining the array of political forces
at work in British society throughout the decades following World War
II.
Though its roots date back to the Liberal government of the early
Twentieth Century,212 the modern U.K. welfare state213 arose out of in209. Id. at 182.
210. See Millon, supra note 11, at 990–92 (applying the concept to the impact of a default
rule—employment at will—on negotiated contractual outcomes).
211. Bagehot: The Shock of the Old, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2008, at 70.
212. See CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 47. The Liberal party held power from 1905 to 1922.
Number10.gov.uk, Prime Ministers in History, http://www.number10.gov.uk/history-andtour/prime-ministers-in-history (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); see also John Clarke et al., The Construction of the British Welfare State, 1945–1975, in COMPARING WELFARE STATES, supra note
38, at 29, 32, 39 (arguing that early twentieth-century British welfare programs were “part of the
attempts by the state to appease, supervise and control an increasingly militant working class”).
213. The term “welfare state” generally describes a set of baseline protections relating to income, health and unemployment insurance, and various other “social services.” See Sanford Le-
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ter-war economic difficulties and what one observer described as the
consequent “craving for stability [that] dominated British public life”—
a fact recognized by the left and the right alike, with both parties “increasingly accept[ing] the idea that the state had to provide jobs and
comforts when business could not.”214 The post-war expansion of the
welfare state, though enacted by the Labour government of 1945 to
1951, grew directly from “foundations . . . laid during the war and accepted by Mr. Churchill’s coalition Government.”215 As Richard Fry,
financial and industrial editor of the Manchester Guardian, summarized
for American readers in 1949:
Today the Englishman is offered—in return for his taxes, local
rates, and national insurance contributions—a wide range of benefits: free education; medical attention, including medicines,
spectacles and the now-famous false teeth; family allowances for
each child except the first; free milk for school children; a fixed
weekly payment in times of sickness or unemployment—as a
right, not as charity; a pension in old age, and a funeral free of
charge.216
The National Health Service—founded in 1948217 and endorsed as
broadly successful today by the right-leaning Economist218—is still
vinson, The Welfare State, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 553,
555 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996); see also Cochrane et al., supra note 38, at 5–7, 12. Views on the
appropriate scope of the welfare state are inevitably bound up with broader views on “distributive
justice”—that is, the desirable “allocation of economic resources found within a given society and
the state’s role, if any, in rectifying ostensible maldistributions.” Levinson, supra, at 554. As Allan Cochrane and his coauthors observe, welfare state programs have historically reflected prevailing prejudices regarding gender roles and family structure, as well as race and ethnicity. See
Cochrane et al., supra note 38, at 14–17.
214. Richard H. Fry, Appraisal of Britain’s Welfare State, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1949, at
SM12 (providing analysis of the financial and industrial editor of the Manchester Guardian); see
also CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 48 (observing that the Conservative Party “captured the middle
ground of British politics” during the interwar period “by adopting sufficiently left-wing policies
to ensure swing voters did not defect”); Clarke et al., supra note 212, at 34.
215. Fry, supra note 214, at SM12; see also Number10.gov.uk, supra note 212. The Labour
Party, created in 1900 by disaffected “working people, trade unionists and socialists,” rose to
prominence following the split of the Liberal Party in 1916, and achieved its first government in
1924. The Labour Party, History of the Labour Party, http://www.labour.org.uk/
history_of_the_labour_party (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
216. Fry, supra note 214. Rajan and Zingales observe that the creation of welfare state programs brought a substantial increase in developed-economy government expenditures relative to
the early part of the twentieth century. The United States, which “emerged from World War II
with its industries largely intact and highly competitive,” naturally pushed for free trade, but in
return the British and others demanded flexibility to implement capital controls in order to maintain fiscal autonomy to pursue welfare-state spending. Rajan & Zingales, supra note 50, at 37–39.
217. National Health Service (UK), About the NHS, http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/
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touted by the Labour Party as one of its greatest achievements.219 The
leftward shift reflected by its foundation would, in fact, pervade British
politics throughout the period between the end of World War II and
Margaret Thatcher’s rise to power in 1979. Although the Labour Party
ruled for just half of that period,220 governing platforms remained leftleaning under both parties221—including with respect to tax policy222—
and pre-Thatcher governments of both parties broadly adhered to a corporatist, “tripartite relationship between state, business and organized
labour.”223

2.

Takeovers and Labour Party Politics

In light of these broad trends, it should come as no surprise that both
the post-war wave of takeovers and the regulatory response to them
were, to a great extent, products of the political left. British economic
historian Leslie Hannah has observed that hostile takeovers “were virtually unknown before 1950,” in part due to “the inadequacy of the information possessed by shareholders about the asset and profit position
of their companies.”224 This began to change, however, under the postwar Labour government. The Companies Act of 1948 mandated far
more elaborate financial reporting than had previously been required,
enabling investigation of targets by would-be bidders.225 Additionally,
the newly granted ability of shareholders to remove directors by ordinary resolution (i.e., by a simple majority) enhanced the governance
thenhs/about/Pages/overview.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
218. See Bagehot: The Shock of the Old, supra note 211.
219. The Labour Party, supra note 215.
220. See Number10.gov.uk, supra note 212. Labour governments ruled from 1945 to 1951
(Attlee), 1964 to 1970, 1974 to 1976 (Wilson), and 1976 to 1979 (Callaghan). Id.
221. See CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 49.
222. See id. at 323–27.
223. Id. at 50; see also TOM HADDEN, COMPANY LAW AND CAPITALISM 439 (2d ed. 1977);
Michael Blanden, The City Regulations on Mergers and Takeovers, in READINGS ON MERGERS
AND TAKEOVERS 199, 215–16 (J.M. Samuels ed., 1972); Alan Dignam & Michael Galanis, Corporate Governance and the Importance of Macroeconomic Context, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD.
201 (2008).
224. LESLIE HANNAH, THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE ECONOMY: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE
149 (1976).
225. See Brian R. Cheffins, Mergers and the Evolution of Patterns of Corporate Ownership
and Control: The British Experience, 46 BUS. HIST. 256, 270 (2004); see also Johnston, supra
note 183, at 427. Cheffins observes, however, that “the UK did not begin to experience a merger
wave until a decade after reform took place,” suggesting that “even if enhanced disclosure regulation did help to foster amalgamation activity, the contribution of company law was merely secondary.” Cheffins, supra, at 270.
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power associated with acquisitions of shares in the marketplace, setting
the stage for hostile takeovers.226
When takeover attempts arose in the 1950s—the first successful
takeover being Charles Clore’s acquisition of J. Sears in 1953—the
business community’s response was decidedly negative.227 But so too
was the market’s response to defensive tactics aimed at circumventing
the shareholders, as management attempted in the Savoy Hotel battle
later in 1953 and the British Aluminium battle in 1958. In the latter
case, the British Aluminium board’s attempt to ensure a deal with its favored bidder by issuing the bidder a sizeable share of the company’s
stock “provoked widespread calls for takeover regulation,” and in 1959,
“the Governor of the Bank of England secretly invited a committee
comprised of trade groups representing merchant banks, institutional investors, the largest commercial banks, and the London Stock Exchange
to devise a code of conduct to regulate takeover bids.”228 This effort resulted in the Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses (Notes),
which established as a matter of principle that shareholders should decide the fate of hostile takeover bids.229 Lacking an enforcement mechanism, the Notes were widely disregarded, but in 1968 the Notes were
replaced by the City Code, described above in Part II.B.230 Though still
self-regulatory in nature, the City Code brought enhanced compliance
through oversight by the City Panel), as well as an enforcement capacity
that “piggybacked” on those of the City Panel’s constituents—notably
the London Stock Exchange’s ability to sanction listed companies, the
Board of Trade’s ability to sanction securities dealers, and the trade associations’ ability to sanction their members.231 The efficacy of this
mode of self-regulation was substantially bolstered through this focus
on “repeat players,”232 as well as the general proximity and homogeneity of the inhabitants of “the City”—London’s financial district.233
226. See CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 363.
227. See Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1756–57.
228. Id. at 1757–58.
229. See id. at 1759.
230. See supra notes 116–54 and accompanying text.
231. Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1759–62. For additional background on events leading
to the development of the City Code and the City Panel, see HADDEN, supra note 223, at 370–78;
Johnston, supra note 183, at 428–36.
232. Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1771–72; Square Mile’s Sheriff, FINANCIAL WORLD
ONLINE, Mar. 2008, https://www.financialworld.co.uk/Archive/2008/2008_03mar/Features/
the_takeover_panel/13916-print.cfm.
233. Armour & Skeel, supra note 1, at 1771–72; see also Blanden, supra note 223, at 200–12;
Bradley, supra note 33, at 299–300. In contrast, U.S. institutional investors’ interests differ substantially with respect to time horizon and involvement in corporate governance. See Bruner, su-
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Again, that the City, left to itself, would select shareholder-centric
principles by which to self-regulate is hardly surprising. What perhaps
is surprising, however, is that these principles would endure and in fact
take on a more decidedly shareholder-friendly form under the Labour
government in place from 1964 to 1970.234 After all, takeovers forced
the issues of corporate power and purpose in the United Kingdom, driving a wedge between the interests of shareholders and those of other
constituencies, just as they latter would in the United States. As Alexander Johnston, a member of the City Panel, would observe in 1980,
historically it was understood that directors owed a duty “to the company (whatever that might mean in a specific case) rather than to the
shareholders,” but that defensive measures by target boards “raised in
an acute form the questions—who was ultimately in charge of a company and whose interests should be safeguarded?”235 Comprehending the
coalescence and persistence of this deeply shareholder-centric structure,
which took its final form in the City Code and the City Panel developed
during a Labour administration, requires grappling with the party’s
complex views on both shareholders and takeovers during this period.
“Government policy and public opinion” in the 1950s and 1960s
were, as James Foreman-Peck and Leslie Hannah explain, “prone to
conclude that Britain needed to become more like the United States in
the scale of its industrial businesses,”236 giving rise to a broadly shared
predisposition in favor of mergers and acquisitions. Hannah explains
that the U.K. government throughout this period was “directly active in
the promotion of mergers,” a policy that was, “despite differences of
approach and emphasis, broadly bipartisan.”237 Cheffins likewise observes the “general consensus that the formation of large firms should
be encouraged because UK industry was failing to take sufficient advantage of size-oriented opportunities for increased efficiencies,” a view
shared by the political left. Labour Prime Minister Harold Wilson himpra note 6, at 1439–42. For a summary of prominent U.K. takeover attempts in the 1950s, see
ALEXANDER JOHNSTON, THE CITY TAKE-OVER CODE 8–18 (1980).
234. See Number10.gov.uk, supra note 212.
235. JOHNSTON, supra note 233, at 11, 13.
236. James Foreman-Peck & Leslie Hannah, Britain: From Economic Liberalism to Socialism—And Back?, in EUROPEAN INDUSTRIAL POLICY: THE TWENTIETH-CENTURY EXPERIENCE
19, 44 (James Foreman-Peck & Giovanni Frederico eds., 1999).
237. HANNAH, supra note 224, at 171; see also SECRETARY OF STATE FOR PRICES AND
CONSUMER PROTECTION [U.K.], A REVIEW OF MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS POLICY: A
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT, 1978, Cm. 7198, at 97 [hereinafter REVIEW OF MONOPOLIES AND
MERGERS POLICY]; R. Goodman, Taming and Controlling Power, in READINGS ON MERGERS
AND TAKEOVERS, supra note 223, at 218, 219.
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self remarked of the mergers of the 1960s that they brought the United
Kingdom “kicking and screaming into the twentieth century.”238 Hostile
bidders were similarly viewed as offering hope of turning around weak
companies and making them more competitive.239
Labour’s position on takeovers evolved considerably over this period,
reflecting simultaneous concerns regarding employment stability and
industrial competitiveness. As of the early 1950s, Harold Wilson “complained about the asset stripping and large tax-free profits associated
with hostile bids.”240 And in 1959, as shadow chancellor, he criticized
the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan in a House of Commons debate, charging that “[j]ust as shareholders are becoming more
and more avid for quick gains, so the Government regard any quick capital gains as good business, to be encouraged whatever the production
realities.”241 Wilson asked how the Government could “appeal for wage
restraint in the payment of a job honestly and well done, while millions
of pounds can be made in this effortless manner”—that is, through takeovers—“by a section which does no work at all?”242 Labour’s 1959
election manifesto derides “the retiring company director with a tax-free
redundancy payment due to a take-over bid,” and, among other things,
calls for increased funding of the National Health Service and overall
“ex tension [sic] of the Welfare State.”243
As of 1959, the year the Notes were adopted, the Labour party was
clearly in favor of statutory regulation of takeovers.244 By the time the
party was in power, however, it evidently saw things differently. Whereas Labour’s 1964 election manifesto expresses continued hostility toward takeovers, the 1966 manifesto makes no mention of them whatever.245 Both documents emphasize Labour’s ongoing commitment to
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 360 (quoting WILLIAM DAVIS, MERGER MANIA 2 (1970)).
Id. at 365–66.
Callaghan, supra note 31, at 744–45.
Id. at 745 (quoting Wilson).
Id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 238, at 6.
LABOUR PARTY [U.K.], BRITAIN BELONGS TO YOU: THE LABOUR PARTY’S POLICY FOR
CONSIDERATION BY THE BRITISH PEOPLE (1959), available at http://politicsresources.net/area/uk/
man/lab59.htm (Labour Party election manifesto). “Redundancy” in this context refers generally
to job loss following the elimination of one’s position. See 13 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
438–39 (2d ed. 1989).
244. Johnston, supra note 183, at 432.
245. Compare LABOUR PARTY [U.K.], THE NEW BRITAIN (1964) [hereinafter 1964
MANIFESTO], available at http://politicsresources.net/area/uk/man/lab64.htm (promising that Labour would “control take-over bids and mergers”), with LABOUR PARTY [U.K.], TIME FOR
DECISION (1966) [hereinafter 1966 MANIFESTO], available at http://politicsresources.net/area/uk/
man/lab66.htm (silent on mergers and take-over bids).
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welfare state programs benefitting employees and others,246 but the
1966 manifesto places this in the context of a broader “National Plan”
with the “central aim . . . to accelerate industrial expansion without undermining our social priorities.”247 This involved not only scaling back
Labour’s attacks on takeovers, but actually facilitating them through the
creation of the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation (IRC), which
aimed to “stimulate rationalisation, modernisation and expansion in
those fields where British industry at present seems unable to compete
with the giant firms of the U.S. and Europe.”248 This move would seem
to be in tension with prior Labour policies, but as Hannah explains,
“earlier fears of Labour leaders that mergers and rationalization created
unemployment had now given way to a feeling that larger (and, it was
hoped, more productive) units would in the long run be better for employment.”249 Interestingly, the same Labour government encouraging
mergers through the IRC was at the same time calling for enhanced
oversight of takeovers through competition (antitrust) regulation by the
Monopolies Commission.250 U.K. competition regulation was, however,
“modest . . . compared with the more stringent US antitrust controls,”
and very few deals were in fact impeded.251
In practice, such tensions in regulatory philosophy were not substantial because the IRC and the Monopolies Commission were both used
by the Labour government as means of intervening to direct and coordinate the conduct and outcome of takeovers toward what Labour leaders
perceived to be the larger public interest.252 The IRC’s exceptionally
broad mandate was to “promote or assist the reorganisation or development of any industry,”253 permitting an extraordinary range of direct
market activity by the IRC. The potential for collision with competition
246. 1964 MANIFESTO, supra note 245; 1966 MANIFESTO, supra note 245; see also Clarke et
al., supra note 212, at 44, 57.
247. 1966 MANIFESTO, supra note 245.
248. Id.; see also DAVIS, supra note 238, at 11; DOUGLAS HAGUE & GEOFFREY WILKINSON,
THE IRC—AN EXPERIMENT IN INDUSTRIAL INTERVENTION 3–5, 13–14 (1983); REVIEW OF
MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS POLICY, supra note 237, at 20; J. Hughes, The Trade Union Response to Mergers, in READINGS ON MERGERS AND TAKEOVERS, supra note 223, at 148, 149.
249. HANNAH, supra note 224, at 172; see also DAVIS, supra note 238, at 2–3.
250. HANNAH, supra note 224, at 172, 179; see also 1966 MANIFESTO, supra note 245
(promising to “reduce inflated costs and profit margins in production and distribution by waging a
vigorous anti-monopoly policy”).
251. HANNAH, supra note 224, at 176; see also REVIEW OF MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS
POLICY, supra note 237, at 17, 97–99.
252. See 1966 MANIFESTO, supra note 245; JOHNSTON, supra note 233, at 31.
253. DAVIS, supra note 238, at 146; HAGUE & WILKINSON, supra note 248, at 22 (quoting
section 2(a) of the Industrial Reorganisation Act of 1966).
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regulation would appear significant, but in practice there was no such
conflict. Where the IRC became involved in a transaction, the matter in
question simply would not be referred to the Monopolies Commission.254 Notwithstanding early recognition of the “need to reassure businessmen that the IRC was not an instrument of the Labour Government
which would be used to force them, for political reasons, to do things
which they did not want to do,”255 the IRC—and, in fact, high government officials including Prime Minister Wilson—did make controversial interventions in high-profile deals. The Labour government effectively determined the outcome of the January 1968 merger between
Leyland Motors and British Motor Holdings256 and the June 1968 takeover of Cambridge Instrument by George Kent.257 The Conservative
Party naturally detested such government interventions in the marketplace, likely impacting its decision to disband the IRC upon its return to
power in 1970.258
In any event, the governing Labour Party ultimately became comfortable with the potential employment impacts of takeover activity because
its leaders believed not only that the right mergers would maximize employment opportunities,259 but also that external structures could sufficiently mitigate any near-term harms. Hannah observes, for example,
that while it was “recognized that there would be unemployment problems following mergers . . . these were now felt to be problems of a
transitional phase,” and that the “social costs faced by unemployed
workers were also more broadly shared as a result of the redundancy
payments scheme initiated by Labour.”260 For example, Labour’s 1966
election manifesto, which abandons criticism of takeovers and strongly
254. DAVIS, supra note 238, at 131, 146; REVIEW OF MONOPOLIES AND MERGERS POLICY,
supra note 237, at 97.
255. HAGUE & WILKINSON, supra note 248, at 27.
256. See DAVIS, supra note 238, at 94–109; HAGUE & WILKINSON, supra note 248, at 119–
33.
257. See DAVIS, supra note 238, at 136–39; HAGUE & WILKINSON, supra note 248, at 72–90.
Alexander Johnston, a member of the City Panel, observed in 1980 that the Panel “had a good
working relationship” with the IRC, facilitating its intervention in the Cambridge Instrument
takeover by authorizing the IRC to publicize the Panel’s conclusion that its conduct had conformed to the City Code. JOHNSTON, supra note 233, at 138.
258. See HAGUE & WILKINSON, supra note 248, at 3, 80–81.
259. Difficult as it may be to imagine today, in the U.K. political climate of the 1960s the
IRC—which Prime Minister Wilson strongly supported—may have appeared relatively moderate
to Labour leaders. Conservatives predictably favored leaving the market to itself, but “left-wing
[Members of Parliament] thought the IRC was a feeble alternative to what they considered to be
the real solution—an extension of public ownership.” DAVIS, supra note 238, at 132; see also
HAGUE & WILKINSON, supra note 248, at 24.
260. HANNAH, supra note 224, at 172 n.26; see also Gelter, supra note 1, at 190.
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emphasizes the benefits of modernizing and rationalizing British industry through the IRC, also reminds voters that the purpose of the Redundancy Payments Act of 1965—providing “lump sum compensation, related to service, to those affected by redundancy”—was to “[e]ase the
transition from one job to another.”261 This bolstered the protections of
the Contract of Employment Act of 1963, which aimed to protect nonunion members lacking collective bargaining capacity by specifying
minimum notice periods.262 Ultimately a shareholder-centric corporate
governance regime could be accepted as politically stable by the left, so
long as other regulatory policies were enacted to address nonshareholders’ interests and ensure social stability.263
Gelter emphasizes that labor legislation of this sort “finally arriv[ed]
during the 1960s and 1970s.”264 Note, however, that the Redundancy
Payments Act was passed in 1965—three years before the shareholdercentric City Code and City Panel took shape. And, of course, the National Health Service, by that time, had been in place for two decades,265
eliminating what might otherwise have constituted one of the most
pressing concerns related to employment stability, especially in the
takeover context. This course of events sheds light on how Harold Wilson—the same Labour leader who had condemned takeovers as incompatible with broader social interests—could, as Prime Minister, accept a
261. 1966 MANIFESTO, supra note 245 (emphasis removed); see also Michael Bennett, Interpreting Unfair Dismissal and Redundancy Payments Law: The Judicial Reluctance to Disapprove
Employer Decisions to Dismiss, 23 STATUTE L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2002).
262. See Bennett, supra note 261, at 136.
263. See Rajan & Zingales, supra note 50, at 45 (“[I]nsurance schemes that will soften the
impact of economic adversity on individuals will help ward off an anti-market reaction.”); cf.
HANNAH, supra note 224, at 197 (observing that “[w]ider considerations of political and social
welfare have always been important in public assessment of modern industrial tendencies,” a
mindset Hannah associated particularly with the Labour Party). It should also be noted that union
leaders themselves appear not to have been interested in direct board representation as a means of
advancing labor interests, fearing that they would lack real governance power, yet appear to employees “to have ‘sold out’ to management.” HADDEN, supra note 223, at 446; cf. Jacoby, supra
note 45, at 34, 50–51 (observing a similar reluctance of the AFL-CIO in the United States to push
for “industrial democracy,” likely due to fear that “any expansion of employee board representation . . . would of necessity require loosening of the labour law’s strictures on employer involvement in representation activities”).
U.K. unions were at their strongest in the 1950s and 1960s, but began to decline in the 1970s.
See Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Governance, and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 865, 884 (2007). This trend
has been accompanied, however, by improved employment law protections. See John Armour,
Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance, 41 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 531, 541 (2003).
264. See Gelter, supra note 1, at 190.
265. See supra notes 217–19 and accompanying text.
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mode of regulation strongly favoring shareholders both in stated principle and in its self-regulatory form.266 Wilson threatened statutory
regulation, to be sure, but shareholder-centric self-regulation was accepted all the same.267

3.

“New Labour” and the Company Law Review

Like its ongoing commitment to the welfare state,268 the British left’s
general tolerance for shareholder-centric corporate governance evidently had not waned by the turn of the millennium, when an in-depth review of company law culminating in the Companies Act (2006) was
undertaken. A Steering Group created by the Department of Trade and
Industry under Tony Blair’s centrist “New Labour”269 government to
aid the company law reform effort explicitly addressed “the proper
scope of company law, that is, whose interests it should be designed to
serve and the legal means by which it should do so.”270 In its February
1999 consultation document, the Steering Group characterized the
preexisting law on directors’ duties as shareholder-centric, citing Eas266. Wilson’s own political centrism may have played a role. Wilson in fact “hovered between moderate left and moderate right throughout the late 1950s and into the 1960s,” and more
left-wing Labour members considered him “a right-winger at heart.” Geoffrey Goodman, Harold
Wilson: Leading Labour Beyond Pipe Dreams, GUARDIAN, May 25, 1995, at 14.
267. See JOHNSTON, supra note 233, at 41, 46–50; Blanden, supra note 223, at 205; Johnston,
supra note 183, at 442; Lee, supra note 133, at 192. The depth of distaste for perceived regulatory
excesses in the United States should also be noted. Then-Executive Director of the Takeover Panel T.P. Lee, writing in 1993, explained that the notion of takeover legislation “appalled the City
and practitioners in this field. It conjured up a ponderous bureaucracy with all the least attractive
features of the then US Securities and Exchange Commission.” Id. Tom Hadden, writing in 1977,
likewise rejected the U.S. model, observing that the “British securities market, unlike the American, is very highly centralized,” and that “[m]any of the functions of the SEC in America can thus
be effectively carried out in Britain by the [London] Stock Exchange authorities and the City
Panel without formal statutory authority.” HADDEN, supra note 223, at 361; see also JOHNSTON,
supra note 233, at 21, 170–78; Blanden, supra note 223, at 212, 216.
268. See John Clarke et al., Remaking Welfare: The British Welfare Regime in the 1980s and
1990s, in COMPARING WELFARE STATES, supra note 38, at 71, 103 (observing that while “there
has been a withdrawal from much direct provision of services, particularly in the field of social
care,” the British government “remains the dominant provider of education, healthcare and income maintenance”). It is interesting to note that, notwithstanding the Thatcher government’s
hostility toward welfare programs, U.K. welfare expenditures remained “remarkably stable” between 1973 and 1996. Clarke and his co-authors attribute this, among other things, to “bureaucratic and professional inertia within the state,” and increases in the elderly and unemployed populations during this period. Id. at 76–79.
269. On the centrism of “New Labour,” see Who Killed New Labour?, ECONOMIST, Sept. 18,
2008, at 37; see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 262; Clarke et al., supra note 268, at
98; Number10.gov.uk, supra note 212.
270. STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 153, at 33, 159–65.
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terbrook and Fischel and suggesting that permitting directors to pursue
“a wider range of interests” would require a change to the company
law.271 The goals of the reform effort were to maximize “benefits for all
participants in the enterprise” while, “to the extent it is appropriate,”
minimizing “the negative impacts of corporate activity on participants”
and maximizing “welfare more widely.”272 This involved explicit consideration of whether to remain with a shareholder-centric formulation
of directors’ duties or to adopt what was termed the “Pluralist” approach, broadly reflecting the team production theory described above,
requiring that directors be duty-bound to maximize aggregate benefits
for all corporate stakeholders.273
The Steering Group rejected the Pluralist approach, taking the view
that, among other things, such a “broader objective” could “dangerously
distract management into a political balancing style at the expense of
economic growth and international competitiveness,” and suggesting
that other stakeholders’ interests “are best made good by changes in
other areas of the law and public policy.”274 The Steering Group preferred what it termed the “Enlightened Shareholder Value” approach,
which preserves “shareholder wealth maximisation” as the “ultimate objective of companies” while requiring that other stakeholders’ interests
be considered toward that end275—an approach ultimately reflected in
section 172 of the Companies Act.276 Characterized by some as “a classic piece of New Labour triangulation,” and as a sort of “half way
house” between shareholder wealth maximization and the Pluralist
view,277 section 172 is more widely, and accurately, recognized as a
continuation of the prior law, requiring that directors pursue the best interests of shareholders.278
271. Id. at 34, 37.
272. Id. at 36.
273. Id. at 37–39.
274. Id. at 44.
275. Id. at 39–42; see also COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY
LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY: COMPLETING THE STRUCTURE 33–34 (2000), available at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23210.pdf [hereinafter COMPLETING THE STRUCTURE];
COMPANY LAW REVIEW STEERING GROUP, MODERN COMPANY LAW FOR A COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY:
DEVELOPING
THE
FRAMEWORK
10–11
(2000),
available
at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file23248.pdf [hereinafter DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK].
276. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172 (U.K.).
277. Giles Richardson & Serle Court, The Companies Act 2006, Directors’ Duties and the
Onset of Insolvency, 23 TOLLEY’S INSOLVENCY L. & PRAC. 138 (2007).
278. See, e.g., DAVIES, supra note 124, at 506–09; DIGNAM & LOWRY, supra note 124, at
389 (observing that section 172 “particularly disappointed the non-governmental organisation
(NGO) community”); Robert Goddard, Directors’ Duties, 12 EDIN. L. REV. 468, 468–69 (2008);
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The U.K. system unquestionably gives shareholders a voice in corporate governance well beyond that possessed by their counterparts in the
United States. As Bernard Black and John Coffee have observed, while
public governance challenges have historically been rare, U.K. institutional shareholders do “act behind closed doors,” informally negotiating
for their desired outcomes before the omnipresent threat that they might
exert their authority to remove recalcitrant directors.279 This “facilitates
rapid and decisive action by investors when firms are in distress,” potentially including “drastic adjustments at labour’s expense.”280 And yet,
as the discussion in this Section demonstrates, a number of the most important developments in U.K. corporate governance occurred on the Labour Party’s watch. As I have argued here, Labour’s willingness to see
the creation of shareholder-centric governance structures reflects, to a
great extent, the simultaneous construction of extra-corporate structures
that address other constituencies’ needs, notably welfare state structures
that substantially mitigate the consequences of job loss.281
Johnston, supra note 183, at 456–57; Andrew Keay, Tackling the Issue of the Corporate Objective: An Analysis of the United Kingdom’s “Enlightened Shareholder Value Approach,” 29
SYDNEY L. REV. 577, 604–07 (2007); Parkinson, supra note 12, at 32–33. The Steering Group
envisioned that the Enlightened Shareholder Value concept would be bolstered by a requirement
that a public company include in its annual report an “Operating and Financial Review (OFR)”
that “would cover all that is material in the directors’ view for users to achieve a proper assessment of the performance and future plans and prospects of the business”—including relationships
with other stakeholders. This disclosure “would enable shareholders and the community as a
whole to monitor performance by directors . . . and to provide appropriate feedback to the company.” DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 275, at 13–14; see also COMPLETING THE
STRUCTURE, supra note 275, at 33–34. Ultimately, however, the OFR “was unexpectedly removed from the statute book and replaced with a ‘Business Review’ which is considerably less
prescriptive about, inter alia, the disclosure that must be made about employment matters.”
Johnston, supra note 183, at 457; see also Tom Burns & John Paterson, Gold Plating, Gold Standard or Base Metal? Making Sense of Narrative Reporting After Repeal of the Operating and
Financial Review Regulations, 2007 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 247 (2007). The Business
Review requires that information regarding “environmental matters,” employees, and “social and
community issues” be included “to the extent necessary for an understanding of” the business,
without further guidance. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 417 (U.K.). In any event, however, such
disclosure is explicitly aimed at permitting shareholders—not other constituencies—to assess directors’ performance of their section 172 duty.
279. Black & Coffee, supra note 4, at 2002, 2028–29, 2041–42. Black and Coffee observe
that British institutions have been particularly willing to intervene to protect their voting and
preemptive rights, and to remove underperforming CEOs. Id. at 2035–37; see also supra notes
126–27 and accompanying text.
280. Howard Gospel & Andrew Pendleton, Markets and Relationships: Finance, Governance, and Labour in the United Kingdom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND LABOUR
MANAGEMENT: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 1, 76–81 (Howard Gospel & Andrew Pendleton eds., 2005).
281. John Cioffi and Martin Höpner have argued more generally that in Germany, France, Italy, and the United States, “center-left parties and politicians have often been instrumental propo-

2010]

THE “ANGLO-AMERICAN” CORPORATION

635

The explanatory power of such variables is underscored by contrast
with circumstances in the United States, where the relative absence of
U.K.-style welfare state structures has had an enormous impact on the
development of the corporate governance system. In some instances, as
the next Section explores, this has led U.S. corporate governance in a
radically different direction.

C.

Shareholders and Stakeholders in the United States

As we have seen, U.S. corporate law, notably in Delaware, has for
decades remained deeply ambivalent regarding the shareholders’ role in
corporate governance and the degree to which shareholder interests and
incentives can be taken as an accurate proxy for those of the public at
large. We have also seen that, although this ambivalence manifests itself
in various ways, the conflicting drives of U.S. corporate governance are
most clearly on display in the field of takeover regulation. Consequently, this Section of the Article will focus on this area, while endeavoring
to discern broader trends that illuminate the overall divergence from
U.K. corporate governance. For the sake of clarity, Figure 2 provides a
summary of the principal contrasts drawn below.

nents of [pro-shareholder corporate governance] reform, while conservative parties and politicians have typically resisted reform and defended the interests of incumbent managers.” John W.
Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: Interests, Preferences,
and Center-Left Party Politics in Corporate Governance Reform, 34 POL. & SOC’Y 463, 464
(2006). In the case of the United States, they point to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which they
describe as “Democrats us[ing] the post-bubble scandals and the collapse of share prices to attack
a deeply conservative and pro-manager Republican leadership and as a well-placed appeal to
middle-class voters in a country where mass shareholding was well established.” Id. at 484. Helen
Callaghan has concluded that the United Kingdom in fact does not fit this pattern, arguing that
left/right competition “from the 1950s until the arrival of Tony Blair . . . was a straightforward
battle between capital and labor,” with Labour attacking the outsider-friendly takeover rules supported by the Conservatives. Callaghan, supra note 31, at 734. In support of this argument, Callaghan cites Wilson’s strong anti-takeover rhetoric of the 1950s, but she does not grapple with
how the Labour Party actually dealt with takeover regulation—and mergers more generally—
once it was in power. See id. at 745.
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FIGURE 2: TAKEOVER REGULATION IN POLITICAL CONTEXT

Time period
Prevailing politics
Social welfare protections

Regulatory mode
Regulatory emphasis

1.

U.K.

U.S.

1960s

1980s

left
(Wilson)

right
(Reagan)

stronger
(welfare state)

weaker
(“employee welfare
state”)282

“City” self-regulation

state courts/legislatures

shareholders

stakeholders

The “Employee Welfare State”

It should be observed, first, that the takeover debate in the United
States arose at a very different time and under very different circumstances than in the United Kingdom. The core issues of takeover regulation were thrashed out in the United Kingdom between 1959, when the
Bank of England spearheaded the development of the Notes on Amalgamation of British Businesses, and 1968, when the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and the associated City Panel on Takeovers and
Mergers were developed.283 The United States likewise saw the Williams Act enacted in 1968, but this federal securities statute does not directly address the use of defensive measures by management—the issue
at the heart of takeover regulation.284 In the United States, the critical
rules for hostile takeovers were not developed until the 1980s, following
a wave of leveraged hostile tender offers.285
While regulatory divergences between different countries may sometimes be explained by reference to just such historical differences, in
282. The “employee welfare state” concept, discussed below, was articulated by David Charny. See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 227–33 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 87. For a general overview of the Williams Act, see ALLEN ET AL., supra
note 7, at 443–44. On the Williams Act’s more modest pro-disclosure aims, see generally Lyman
Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989).
285. See supra notes 74–85 and accompanying text. Despite the absence of legal impediments, takeovers emerged only gradually starting in the early 1960s, perhaps reflecting cultural
aversion toward this “newly emerging social phenomenon.” See Johnson & Millon, supra note
284, at 1890–91.
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this case, history renders the nature of the divergence more puzzling.
Whereas the shareholder-centric U.K. takeover regime predominantly
took shape during the left-leaning Labour administration of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, U.S. takeover regulation, which strongly favors
non-shareholder constituencies such as management and employees,
predominantly took shape during the presidency of Ronald Reagan, a
Republican who strongly opposed governmental intrusions in the marketplace. Takeover regulation in the United States is, to be sure, largely
a matter of state law, but that such an anti-shareholder regulatory regime
should have emerged during the pro-market and pro-takeover Reagan
administration286 is as surprising as a pro-shareholder regime taking
shape under the U.K. Labour Party.
Neither would be predicted by Roe’s social democracy theory, which
associates anti-shareholder policies with left-leaning politics and proshareholder policies with right-leaning politics.287 Indeed the analysis of
this Article has suggested that it may have been the very presence of
left-leaning, social democratic regulatory structures in the United Kingdom that permitted the coalescence and maintenance of a shareholdercentric corporate governance system. This suggests that, conversely, the
emergence of a more stakeholder-oriented regime in the United States
may be related to the relative weakness of social democratic structures.
Unlike in the United Kingdom and most other industrialized countries, where social welfare programs have been administered predominantly by the government, in the United States large corporate employers “have been primarily responsible for workers’ social welfare.”288
This includes “health insurance, pensions, unemployment insurance (in
the form of severance pay, and job security and income guarantees),
disability insurance, and life insurance,” as well as mandatory employer
contributions to various state-run programs.289 David Charny explains
286. See ROE, supra note 175, at 156; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 588, 627–29 (2003); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2510
(2005); see also Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, The Reagan Presidency,
http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/reference/pressketch.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); The
White House, Ronald Reagan, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents/ronaldreagan/ (last
visited Feb. 26, 2010).
287. See supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text.
288. David Charny, The Employee Welfare State in Transition, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1601
(1996).
289. Id. at 1601–03; see also Jacoby, supra note 45, at 37–39; John Clarke, US Welfare: Variations on the Liberal Regime, in COMPARING WELFARE STATES, supra note 38, at 113, 114–16;
Orly Lobel, The Four Pillars of Work Law, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1542–43 (2006) (reviewing
RAYMOND HOGLER, EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES: LAW, POLICY, AND
PRACTICE (2004) and KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT
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that this “elaborate web of legally enforceable contracts, implicit
agreements, background legal norms, and discrete public regulatory and
insurance systems” aims to accomplish the very things that government
programs do in other countries, namely, protecting workers against the
risk of lost income, and providing health and retirement benefits.290
Charny observes that while this system “provided fairly comprehensive
social insurance protections” from the 1920s to the 1970s, those elements of the U.S. approach not taking the form of enforceable legal
rights—so-called implicit contracts—are inevitably difficult to maintain
during periods of crisis.291 In particular, hostile takeovers upset the relationships within the corporation that formed the foundation of what he
terms “the employee welfare state.”292
The United States and the United Kingdom have similarly emphasized private pensions,293 and neither country’s labor laws offer particularly strong protections (either in the context of hostile takeovers or
more generally),294 though as between the two countries these protections tend to be weaker in the United States.295 The two countries have
taken radically different approaches, however, to at least one of the core
components of workers’ social welfare that Charny identifies—health
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004)); Toni Johnson, Council on Foreign Relations, Healthcare Costs and U.S. Competitiveness (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/publication/
13325/.
290. Charny, supra note 288, at 1606; see also Levinson, supra note 213, at 555.
291. Charny, supra note 288, at 1601.
292. Id. at 1601–20; see also Jacoby, supra note 45, at 35–36, 39–42; Julia Contreras & Orly
Lobel, Walmartization and the Fair Share Health Care Acts, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 105, 111–
12 (2006); Lobel, supra note 289, at 1542–49; cf. Matthew Dolan, Blame is Put on Management,
but Hourly Workers, Retirees Face More Pain, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, at A4 (“The three
Detroit auto makers provide health care for more than one million Americans.”). Others have
used less flattering terms. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 289, at 114 (discussing European descriptions of the United States as a “laggard” or “deviant” with respect to welfare policy). On the concept of implicit contracts, see generally Shleifer & Summers, supra note 95.
293. See CHEFFINS, supra note 4, at 348. For a historical description of U.K. pension programs, see Simon Deakin, Workers, Finance and Democracy, in THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW
79, 89–94 (Catherine Barnard et al. eds., 2004).
294. See Simon Deakin et al., Implicit Contracts, Takeovers, and Corporate Governance: In
the Shadow of the City Code 12 (ESRC Ctr. for Bus. Research, Univ. of Cambridge, Working
Paper 254, 2002), available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/cbr/cbrwps/wp254.html.
295. See, e.g., Margarita Estevez-Abe et al., Social Protection and the Formation of Skills: A
Reinterpretation of the Welfare State, in VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM: THE INSTITUTIONAL
FOUNDATIONS OF COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 2, at 145, 165–73; Gelter, supra note
1, at 170, 190; cf. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 153–54 (reporting OECD data indicating a higher degree of “corporatism” in the United Kingdom than the United States); Gospel &
Pendleton, supra note 280, at 68 (reporting substantial “income inequality” in both countries, but
adding that “[t]his is most marked of all in the United States”).
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care. In the United States, the medical profession and the insurance industry have historically opposed comprehensive national health insurance programs.296 So unlike the United Kingdom, which maintains the
reasonably well regarded National Health Service297—a system founded
in 1948 that today “remains free at the point of use for anyone who is
resident in the UK”298—the United States adheres to an employer-based
system, at considerably higher cost, that as of 2007 provided no coverage whatsoever to 45.7 million Americans.299

2.

Takeovers and Stakeholders

It is quite striking, in this light, that the most overtly stakeholderoriented elements of U.S. takeover regulation arising out of the wave of
leveraged hostile tender offers in the 1980s were often linked to the perceived insufficiency of social safety nets and the view that the political
quid pro quo represented by Charny’s “employee welfare state” was not
being respected. For example, the preamble to a 1987 North Carolina
anti-takeover statute noted the “increasing frequency” of hostile takeovers and the “high unemployment” that can result from such deals. It further emphasized that potentially vulnerable local corporations “provide
their North Carolina employees with health, retirement and other benefits.”300 Such concerns were heightened in the 1980s, when social welfare programs were substantially scaled back.301 As of 1983, fifty-eight
percent of Americans received health coverage through their employers,
and instability in the U.S. economy throughout the decade caused wide296. See Clarke, supra note 289, at 123, 138. For a brief discussion of health care reform efforts following the current crisis, see infra notes 359–64 and accompanying text.
297. See, e.g., Bagehot: The Shock of the Old, supra note 211.
298. National Health Service (UK), supra note 217; see also National Health Service (UK),
NHS
Core
Principles,
http://www.nhs.uk/NHSEngland/thenhs/about/Pages/
nhscoreprinciples.aspx (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
299. See Contreras & Lobel, supra note 292, at 108–12; Johnson, supra note 289 (reporting
that the “United States spends an estimated $2 trillion annually on healthcare expenses, more than
any other industrialized country,” and that U.S. health care expenditures amounted to “16 percent
of its GDP in 2008,” again “higher than any other developed nation”); Press Release, U.S. Census
Bureau, Household Income Rises, Poverty Rate Unchanged, Number of Uninsured Down (Aug.
26,
2008),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/
income_wealth/012528.html.
300. See Millon, supra note 48, at 922–24 (quoting and citing 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 122, and
discussing other similar state statutes); see also Lyman Johnson, State Takeover Statutes: Constitutionality, Community, and Heresy, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1051, 1053–54 (1988); Johnson,
supra note 80, at 909–10; Johnson & Millon, supra note 284, at 1878–82; Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 87 MICH. L. REV. 846, 848–53
(1989).
301. See Clarke, supra note 289, at 125–29, 133–34.
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spread anxiety regarding “the security of their healthcare arrangements.”302 In effect, unemployment meant the loss of access to affordable health care.303 Particularly in the face of such uncertainty, the
quely American “employee welfare state” was perceived to be
threatened by leveraged hostile tender offers, precipitating laws that,
from the British perspective, appear strikingly “pluralist” and thus incompatible with the U.K. corporate governance system.304
These dynamics are inevitably less pronounced in states where takeover regulation has largely been left to case law, but even in Delaware,
concern for non-shareholders comes through in major cases of the 1980s
and in judges’ subsequent discussions of these cases. In Unocal, the
case establishing the core evaluative structure for takeover defenses, the
Delaware Supreme Court stated that analysis of a defensive measure’s
proportionality could include “its effect on the corporate enterprise,” including “the impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e.,
creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally).”305 While the court did hold in Revlon that the board must focus
on maximizing the price received by shareholders in a sale, break-up, or
change of control, this duty applies only where such an outcome is “inevitable.”306 Indeed, in Paramount v. Time, the court reiterated Unocal’s
“constituencies” language in support of its holding that a target board
could refuse to negotiate with a bidder making an attractive all-cash, allshares offer in favor of its own long-term plan for the company’s future.307

302. Id. at 137.
303. See id.
304. See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 153, at 48 (describing U.S. “stakeholder statutes” as reflecting “a pluralistic approach”). While it is clearly the perception of the matter that
drives the politics, it should be noted that empirical studies on the effects of hostile takeovers report mixed results. See, e.g., OESTERLE, supra note 63, at 660 (“The data gathered demonstrates . . . that on average, bidder gains from disadvantaging any one of the [stakeholder] groups
explain only a small portion of the premiums paid to target shareholders.”); Charny, supra note
288, at 1629 (observing that leveraged buyouts “statistically appear not to be associated with the
massive employment cuts that the Summers/Schleifer [implicit contract] analysis would predict,”
but adding that “[o]ne might hypothesize that labor-cost savings are instead accomplished by cutting benefits”); Deakin et al., supra note 294, at 14 (“The quantitative methods which are used to
measure the effects of bids upon shareholder wealth are not able to specify whether those gains
came from increased productive efficiency or wealth transfers.”); Gospel & Pendleton, supra note
280, at 67–68; Jacoby, supra note 45, at 36 (“[D]ata show that annual wage growth is 1–2 per
cent higher in those companies which are subject to anti-takeover laws.”).
305. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
306. See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text.
307. See Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1990).
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That such policy-laden doctrines should take shape in judicial opinions is hardly surprising, given the Delaware General Assembly’s
steadfast refusal to legislate on hostile takeovers.308 Former Delaware
Chancellor William Allen, then-Vice Chancellor (now Justice) Jack Jacobs, and Vice Chancellor Leo Strine observe (in a law review article)
that “amendments to the [Delaware General Corporation Law] have
rarely been the method used to confront the major developments occurring in the mergers and acquisitions marketplace during the last thirty
years,” creating a “legislative vacuum” and thrusting upon the courts the
task of creating “legal rules [that] involve policy choices.”309 Such
work, they write, “unavoidably (and awkwardly) acquires legislative
characteristics.”310 While the Delaware General Corporation Law has
explicitly endorsed neither a shareholder-oriented nor a stakeholderoriented view of the corporation,311 these jurists candidly concede that
judges facing takeover cases “are unavoidably aware that the interests of
more than stockholders are usually at stake” and express “uncertainty
over whether the [shareholder-centric] property model is, in fact, the
corporate law system that will best facilitate the maximization of societal wealth.”312 Ultimately they recognize as “credibly arguable” the
claim that board power over hostile takeover attempts can effectively
balance the interests of shareholders and other stakeholders.313 This notion was, of course, flatly rejected by the U.K. Steering Group spearheading the Companies Act review,314 which declares shareholder
wealth maximization to be the defining purpose of a U.K. corporation.315 Delaware judges facing takeover cases have, for lack of legislative action, been forced to address defining issues of corporate law that
can only be resolved by reference to “exogenous and broad-based social
norms.”316

308. Delaware’s statute does include a business combination provision, see DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 203 (2001), but this provision includes a number of exceptions, and is “fairly mild as antitakeover statutes go.” ALLEN ET AL., supra note 7, at 609 n.59.
309. Allen, Jacobs & Strine, supra note 53, at 1068.
310. Id. at 1070.
311. See id. at 1074–82.
312. Id. at 1083–84.
313. Id. at 1085; see also Johnson, supra note 80, at 873–85.
314. See STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK, supra note 153, at 44; COMPLETING THE STRUCTURE, supra note 275, at 34; DEVELOPING THE FRAMEWORK, supra note 275, at 14.
315. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 172(1) (U.K.).
316. See Johnson, supra note 80, at 886–91.
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Employee Welfare in the Current Environment

While the rise of institutional investors317 and increasing capital mobility over recent decades may tend to favor the interests of shareholders
capable of voting with their feet,318 more recent events tend to suggest
that the U.S. political dynamics described above remain just as powerful
today. For example, when Walmart—the largest private sector employer
in the United States as of 2006—endeavored to boost returns for shareholders at the expense of other constituencies by “shifting health care
costs” to employees and to taxpayers funding limited state health care
programs, states reacted angrily with legislation aimed at thrusting those
costs back onto the company.319 Although such legislative efforts were
found to be preempted by federal employment legislation,320 Walmart
ultimately decided to improve the health benefits offered to its employees, “reacting to a vast range of campaigns and litigation against the
corporation.”321 As Julia Contreras and Orly Lobel rightly suggest,
Walmart’s problems stemmed from bucking the political equilibrium
represented by Charny’s “employee welfare state” by excessively favoring shareholders at the expense of employees and taxpayers.322
Likewise, the current economic and financial crisis has brought such
concerns to the fore as the U.S. public grapples with widespread fears of
job loss. Opinion polls tend to suggest that loss of access to affordable
health care looms large among current employment-related fears.323
Such concerns are not unfounded. Indeed, it is thought that “nearly half
317. See Bruner, supra note 6, at 1432–35.
318. See Allen, supra note 53, at 279; Rajan & Zingales, supra note 50. See generally Dignam & Galanis, supra note 223.
319. See Contreras & Lobel, supra note 292, at 105–17.
320. See id. at 125–34 (discussing preemption of Maryland’s Fair Share Health Care Act by
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, or ERISA).
321. Id. at 121–22.
322. See id. at 111–13, 134–35; see also Ceci Connolly, At Wal-Mart, a Health-Care Turnaround, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2009, at A01.
323. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MORE WORKERS ANTICIPATE PAY CUTS, LAYOFFS
1 (2009), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/492.pdf (reporting that, as of February
2009, the “proportion of Americans citing jobs or unemployment as the nation’s most important
economic problem has more than quadrupled—from 10% to 42%—since early October,” and that
24% of workers polled considered a loss of “some” or “all” of their health benefits “very” or
“somewhat” likely over the next year); Lydia Saad, Americans Rate National and Personal
Healthcare Differently, Dec. 4, 2008, available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/112813/
Americans-Rate-National-Personal-Healthcare-Differently.aspx (reporting, as of December 2008,
that 79% of Americans “say they are dissatisfied with the total cost of healthcare in this country,”
that 14% say the system is “in a state of crisis,” and that 59% say it has “major problems”); see
also John Fairhall & Kate Steadman, The New Uninsured, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 2009, at HE01;
Francesca Lunzer Kritz, Staying Insured After Job Loss, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2009, at F1.
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of all recent home foreclosures have resulted, in part, from families being hit by health expenses not covered by insurance.”324 As of March
2009, the Big Three automakers—Chrysler, Ford, and General Motors—“provide[d] health care for more than one million Americans, including union retirees and their dependents,”325 creating substantial
complications in negotiations with unions over the fate of the struggling
Chrysler and General Motors.326 Concerns regarding loss of health care
due to unemployment have become a mainstay of American popular
media, with pundits offering contradictory advice on how to plan for life
without access to affordable health care. One writer for the New York
Times, for example, advises readers to “[u]se it before you lose it,”327
while CNN.com warns readers at risk of losing their jobs to avoid the
temptation to order last-minute tests that might reveal a “pre-existing
condition,” rendering it “very difficult, if not impossible” to find affordable replacement coverage directly from private insurers.328
Meanwhile, in the United Kingdom, the National Health Service’s
message to those who have lost jobs reads: “If coping is getting hard,
don’t hesitate to contact your GP.”329 This contrast reflects the absence
in the United Kingdom of a set of weighty social concerns that have
long tended to inhibit U.S. corporate governance from endorsing shareholder interests as the defining purpose of the public corporation.

D.

Ownership Structure and Shareholder Orientation

In this Part, I have argued that the relative absence of social democratic structures in the United States has tended to impede the development of a starkly shareholder-centric corporate governance system resembling that in the United Kingdom—and that the fundamental
324. Harry and Louise Ride Again, ECONOMIST, Apr. 4, 2009, at 36, 36 (attributed to Kathleen Sebelius, nominee for U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services).
325. Dolan, supra note 292, at A4.
326. See Johnson, supra note 289.
327. Walecia Konrad, Hanging on to Health Coverage, if the Job Goes Away, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 7, 2009, at B6.
328. Elizabeth Cohen, Fear a Layoff? Don’t Make These Health Care Mistakes, CNN.COM,
Feb. 5, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/02/05/ep.health.insurance.loss/index.html; see
also John Dorschner, Insurers Shun Those Taking Certain Meds, MIAMI HERALD, Mar. 28, 2009,
at 1A. On the strain that job loss is placing on hospitals and state-based health care programs, see
Lisa Girion & Mark Medina, Recession Has Some Hospitals on the Brink, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 14,
2009, at A1; Kevin Sack & Katie Zezima, Growing Need for Medicaid Puts Added Financial
Burden on States, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, at A25.
329. NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE (UK) BRISTOL, COPING WITH THE STRESS OF JOB LOSS,
(2009), available at http://www.bristolpct.nhs.uk/PublicHealth/bristol_leaflet.pdf.
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political structures resulting in U.S. ambivalence regarding shareholders
remain firmly in place today.330 One might object, however, that if social democracy and shareholder orientation are somehow correlated,
then we ought to observe even more shareholder-centrism in, say, continental Europe—not less. The key to grappling with this problem is to
focus again on the sequencing: that is, how and why this issue of shareholder orientation arises in the United States and the United Kingdom at
all.
As previously noted, Martin Gelter rightly observes that since “concentrated ownership is the international norm and dispersed ownership
the exception, one could speak of concentrated ownership as the primeval state of any corporate governance system.”331 Consequently, “it
is not the persistence of concentrated ownership, but rather its unraveling in the United States and the United Kingdom that calls for an explanation.”332 As Gelter explores in some detail, in much of the world,
shareholder power is simply a given due to concentrated ownership.
Thus, the principal regulatory issue remains how to counteract that innate shareholder power through various types of stakeholder-oriented
protections (as illustrated in Figure 3).333 In the United States and the
330. I do not intend to suggest that shareholder-oriented reform efforts are not vigorously
pursued by their advocates. For example, in 2007 North Dakota enacted the “North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act,” N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-01 to -33 (2005 & Supp. 2007), permitting public companies to opt into a regime with “a set of provisions that looks like a shareholder rights advocate’s wish list.” Given Delaware’s traditional dominance and institutional
capabilities, however, it remains unlikely that this development will materially affect Delaware’s
position as the predominant jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. public companies. See The
North Dakota Experiment, Posting of Larry Ribstein to the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov (Apr. 23,
2007, 23:48 EST).
331. Gelter, supra note 1, at 182.
332. Id.
333. See id. at 154–76; see also Gerhard Schnyder, Revisiting the Party Paradox of Finance
Capitalism: Social Democratic Preferences and Corporate Governance Reforms in Switzerland,
Sweden and the Netherlands, 44 COMP. POL. STUD. (forthcoming 2011) (exploring the role of
labor politics in the divergent corporate governance systems of these three countries). Note, however, that while I depict ownership structures in binary terms for the sake of clarity, there is in
fact a high degree of variation across countries with respect to degree of ownership dispersal. See
supra note 1. Intermediate cases may well defy straightforward categorization in these terms—
notably, countries like Canada and Australia that, although dominated by blockholders, tend to be
market-oriented in outlook. See supra note 4. While beyond the scope of this Article, it should be
noted that the role that politics plays in corporate governance in such countries may differ from
the role politics plays in other concentrated systems. This is due, among other things, to the cultural proximity of countries like Canada and Australia to the United States and the United Kingdom. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from Australia, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 13 (2002); Alan Dignam, The Role of Competition in Determining
Corporate Governance Outcomes: Lessons from Australia’s Corporate Governance System, 68
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United Kingdom, on the other hand, the dispersal of ownership raises
precisely the opposite regulatory issue. In the development of a dispersed ownership structure, the challenge becomes inducing people to
accept the status of minority investors through the construction of
shareholder-oriented protections.
FIGURE 3: OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE AND REGULATORY POSTURE
REGARDING SHAREHOLDERS

As my argument in this Article suggests, however, this process of
ownership dispersal requires a constant recalibration of emergent shareholder and stakeholder protections to balance shareholders’ comfort
with minority status and stakeholders’ comfort with shareholder-centric
governance. In this way, shareholder and stakeholder regulatory protections in a dispersed ownership system develop in response to one another. While shareholder protections initially inducing ownership dispersal
may occur entirely in the marketplace, and thus largely outside the glare
of politics, the later development of formal regulatory protections inevitably occurs in a more overtly political arena. As we have seen,
where stakeholder protections are more robust outside the corporate goMOD. L. REV. 765 (2005); Randall Morck et al., The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm—A
History of Corporate Ownership in Canada (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
10635, 2004), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10635.
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vernance system, shareholder-centric corporate governance structures
will encounter less political resistance. But conversely, where stakeholder protections outside the corporate governance system remain
weaker, we can expect political opposition to arise, inhibiting the emergence of shareholder-centrism and favoring flexibility to accommodate
stakeholders’ interests within corporate governance itself.

IV. POLITICAL PRECONDITIONS TO SHAREHOLDER-CENTRIC
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
At the outset, I observed that the use of comparative analysis to generate claims about what a given country’s regulatory system ought to do
is fraught with complex problems and, in particular, that social, cultural,
and political variables are often airbrushed out of the picture to facilitate
straightforward cross-border comparisons. As the foregoing discussion
suggests, comparative analyses ignoring the impact of political context
will inevitably present a distorted picture, resulting in unsupported
claims regarding what the future might bring.
This problem is readily apparent in normative work advocating that
one country adopt a practice or norm prevalent in another—for instance,
shareholder-centrism. The problem also arises in descriptive work forecasting convergence on such a global model or norm. Lucian Bebchuk,
for example, has suggested that the United States should adopt something resembling the strong shareholder-centrism of U.K. corporate governance, but no analysis of the substantial political and institutional
differences discussed above is provided.334 His dismissal of stakeholders’ interests as mere cover for management entrenchment—again, with
no substantial political or historical analysis335—is perhaps ironic in
light of his own prior work with Mark Roe on the power of path dependence in corporate governance, exploring, among other things, the role
of “complementarities” between regulatory regimes and firm structures.336
To be sure, a number of variables beyond those discussed here have
played important roles in determining the path of U.S. corporate governance. In the case of Delaware, one such variable is its competition with
other states to attract incorporations, which might reasonably lead one
to expect its law to skew toward the interests of management. Another
334. See Bebchuk, supra note 23, at 847–50.
335. See id. at 908–13.
336. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 1, at 155–56, 168.
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variable is Delaware’s competition with Washington, D.C., which casts
a long shadow over the state, given the ability and demonstrated willingness of Congress and the Securities and Exchange Commission to
“federalize” vast swathes of the corporate governance terrain in times of
perceived crisis.337 The point here is not to suggest that management entrenchment has no explanatory power with respect to stakeholderoriented elements of U.S. corporate governance, but rather to challenge
the notion that it presents a complete explanation for it. As Bebchuk
himself observes (with Roe), “if countries differ systematically in their
firms and technologies, then the legal rules that would be most efficient
for them might differ”—that is, each may represent a unique equilibrium, depending on the interaction of firm-level relationships and legal
rules.338 “Culture and ideology,” they rightly conclude, “might influence
a country’s choice of corporate law.”339 In my view, this approach offers
considerably greater potential for illuminating stakeholder-oriented
elements of U.S. corporate governance than the simplistic management
entrenchment story does.
Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, meanwhile, have provocatively argued that “[t]here is no longer any serious competitor to the
view that corporate law should principally strive to increase long-term
shareholder value,” declaring an “end of history for corporate law.”340
Specifically, they anticipate equity market pressure toward convergence
on the model of “Anglo-American corporate and securities law.”341
Having lumped together the United States and the United Kingdom as
the joint shareholder-centric model for corporate governance, however,
they almost immediately have to concede that substantial differences
persist in core doctrinal areas illuminating corporate purpose—notably,
in takeover regulation—permitting only the unsupported “conjecture
that the law on both sides of the Atlantic will ultimately converge on a
single regime.”342 Ultimately they concede the possibility of “efficient
non-convergence”—due, among other things, to “local social struc337. See supra notes 181–84. See generally William J. Carney, The Production of Corporate
Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998); Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 286; Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 286; Robert B. Thompson, Defining the Shareholder’s Role, Defining
a Role for State Law: Folk at 40, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 771, 778–82 (2008). Fear of foreign takeovers may also have played a role. See, e.g., Japanese Takeovers ‘A Trickle,’ N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
1987, at 37.
338. Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 1, at 168.
339. Id.
340. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 202, at 439.
341. Id. at 455.
342. Id. at 458.
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tures”—but provide no substantial analysis of the relationship between
corporate governance and politics.343
The Anatomy of Corporate Law, likewise, purports to articulate a
single defining problem of corporate governance worldwide—
minimizing agency costs.344 To be sure, the concept of functional equivalence and the inclusion of multiple forms of agency costs allow the
authors some capacity to account for observed divergences,345 yet the
sorts of divergences discussed in this Article inevitably sketch the outer
boundary of their model’s explanatory domain—again, a point the authors effectively concede.346 For example, in the book’s first edition,
radical differences in U.S. and U.K. takeover regulation—providing “a
timely reminder that ‘Anglo-American’ company law is not the unity
that is sometimes assumed”—are explained as simply reflecting varying
levels of confidence in the merits of “centralized management.”347 The
authors do obliquely suggest that something more fundamental may be
at work, observing that Delaware takeover law is “difficult to justify” in
terms of agency costs to shareholders, and they ultimately concede that
explaining such regulatory divergences in greater depth “requires placing the legal rules in a broader economic and social context.”348 This
move, of course, involves stepping outside the methodological framework upon which the book’s analysis rests349—which the authors more
decidedly do in the book’s second edition, where “the stark contrast between U.S. and UK corporate law” is cited as an “extremely powerful
example” of how “history, economics, and political economy cause corporate law to differ across jurisdictions regardless of ownership structure.”350 They observe that “[t]he UK offers what is arguably the most
shareholder-centered corporate law of any of our core jurisdictions,” citing “particularly the City Code,” whereas “U.S. law is more board343. See id. at 464–65; see also GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at 284 (arguing that the
political complexity of corporate governance will likely preclude convergence); Hall & Thelen,
supra note 187, at 23 (“Not all changes grouped together under the rubric of ‘liberalization’ produce meaningful ‘convergence’ . . . .”).
344. See supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 34–37 and accompanying text.
346. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
347. Paul Davies & Klaus Hopt, Control Transactions, in REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 157, 172–73
(1st ed. 2004).
348. Id. at 189–91.
349. See Skeel, supra note 8, at 1539–43 (observing that as a consequence of the authors’ decision not to address the “messy factors” of history and politics, “their explanations for jurisdictional divergences often have an arbitrary, ungrounded quality”).
350. See Davies et al., supra note 41, at 313.
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centric than that of any other jurisdiction,” a distinction attributable “not
[to] ownership structure but [to] history and political economy.”351
This illustrates a methodological challenge that Ralf Michaels associates with functionalist comparative work—the need to state the problem at a high level of abstraction to achieve the universality that crossborder comparison would seem to demand.352 As one might imagine,
this need is particularly strong where the effort is to develop a global
theory. Nuance is inevitably sacrificed and, with it, the ability to describe doctrinal structures that do not address co-extensive sets of problems in different countries. This shortcoming is what analysis of the political and social contexts surrounding U.S. and U.K. corporate
governance most clearly reveals. Notwithstanding broad similarities in
the corporate form the world over—which, to be sure, are both very real
and well worth exploring—the public corporation does not in fact perform perfectly co-extensive sets of functions in the United States and
the United Kingdom, let alone in any two countries. As we have seen,
the existence of more robust protections for non-shareholders outside
the U.K. corporate governance system has been pivotal in permitting a
more single-minded focus on shareholders within it. And conversely,
the historical role of public corporations in maintaining what Charny
termed the “employee welfare state” has inextricably bound U.S. corporate governance to the achievement of a range of social goals that lie
well beyond what Britons expect their own corporations to accomplish.
Britons and Americans do not hold identical sets of goals for their public corporations, and consequently their corporate governance systems
are subject to social and political pressures that, in some cases, are radically different.
I have endeavored to avoid the methodological problem of excessive
abstraction by relaxing the assumption that there is a single defining
problem at which all corporate governance structures take aim. But, at
the same time, one may avoid abstraction only to disappear into the excessively “contingent”353—the problem of contextualism.354 I suggested
351. Id. The jurisdictions emphasized in the book include France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. See Armour, Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 22, at
3. With respect to the U.S./U.K. divergence, the authors suggest that “populism and financial collapse . . . facilitated the rise of managerial capitalism” in the United States, whereas the rise of
institutional shareholders following World War II led to “a shareholder-centric company law” in
the United Kingdom. Davies et al., supra note 41, at 313.
352. Michaels, supra note 15, at 367.
353. Id. at 368.
354. See supra notes 32–42 and accompanying text.
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at the outset that these twin limitations counsel restraint in the conclusions we draw from comparative study, but that, at the same time, recognition of the need for restraint represents an opportunity in itself.
From the perspective of domestic law, judged by reference to its own
metrics, my comparative analysis suggests that the on-going debate regarding the role of shareholders in U.S. corporate life355 simply cannot
be limited to the regulatory fields typically associated with the term
corporate governance (e.g., corporate law, securities regulation, exchange listing rules). The manner in which the U.S. and U.K. corporate
governance systems have developed vividly illustrates the deep connection between corporate governance and numerous other forms of regulation that condition relationships within the corporate enterprise. This relationship presents a significant challenge to those who believe that
issues of corporate purpose can be resolved in a politically stable manner from within the corporate governance system itself.
As described above, the prevailing view of the corporation among
U.S. academics holds that the corporation should, and generally does,
resemble what rational stakeholders would negotiate for themselves.
The nexus view, as it is known, depicts the corporation as a fundamentally private endeavor.356 In light of the foregoing political analysis, the
most remarkable feature of this view is the implied sanctity of corporate
law itself. While the negotiation is explicitly hypothetical and essentially metaphorical,357 there is nevertheless a hierarchy of law expressed
through the implicit sequencing of various regulatory structures affecting stakeholders’ relationships. The corporate “contract”—representing
what purportedly rational parties would settle upon—is effectively
deemed sacrosanct. It is held constant while other bodies of law and
contractual systems arrange themselves by reference to it.358 Even taken
as a metaphor, however, it is at best a weak one. In terms of dispersed
355. I focus here on U.S. corporate governance simply because the issue of corporate purpose
has not been resolved in the United States with anything resembling the clarity or finality of the
U.K. company law review process. See supra notes 150–53, 269–78 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 100–07.
357. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 15 (depicting corporate law, by “analogy to contract,” as including “standby terms . . . facilitat[ing] actual contracts”). As Lyman Johnson observes, the substitution of what a judge or legislator believes rational stakeholders would
agree to for actual consent amounts to “a claim about the vitality and ubiquity of certain unerring
abstract tenets of economics, and only derivatively (and secondarily) a claim about particular
people’s actual desires and conduct.” See Lyman Johnson, Individual and Collective Sovereignty
in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2220–23 (1992) (reviewing
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, and ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., THE GOOD SOCIETY
(1991)).
358. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 17, at 37–39.
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ownership systems, the United States and the United Kingdom are the
most significant data points. And as the analysis above demonstrates,
both have taken shape through much larger and more complex political
and social processes than the nexus theory can begin to accommodate.
That the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems have, with all
their differences, persisted for decades suggests that there are multiple
stable equilibria within the dispersed ownership structure. This raises
some important considerations for U.S. policymakers contemplating
corporate governance reform. First, it behooves us to understand what a
given equilibrium actually consists of—that is, what balance of forces a
system represents—before we set off to reform it.359 Should we seek to
adopt a more shareholder-centric conception of corporate purpose in the
United States—say, for any benefits we think this clarity of mission
might offer—we would do well to consider the larger structures that
have made such an approach politically stable in the United Kingdom.
To be sure, the U.K. case suggests that we could create a starkly shareholder-centric corporate governance system if we really wanted it. But it
also suggests that, to remain politically viable over time, such an approach would require substantially greater non-shareholder protections
outside corporate law360—a move that would require fundamental
changes to existing social welfare structures that are unlikely to attract
sustained political support.361
This gives rise to a second point for policymakers to consider. While
I have argued that the U.S. and U.K. corporate governance systems reflect two different political equilibria, I most certainly do not intend to
suggest that they represent functionally equivalent means of providing
social welfare protections. To some degree, weaker employment protections and the persistence of a health care system that leaves tens of millions uninsured simply reflect a higher degree of tolerance for distribu359. See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 1, at 194; GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 1, at xiv.
360. See, e.g., Gelter, supra note 1, at 186, 194 (observing the importance of “institutional
complementarities” in advancing reform efforts); Hall & Soskice, supra note 2, at 17–18; cf. Contreras & Lobel, supra note 292, at 134–35 (arguing, in the health care context, that either a national system or a mandatory employer system is ultimately required); Dolan, supra note 292, at
A4 (quoting a UAW representative’s view that “[s]omeone is going to have to pay for health
care,” and that “[i]f it’s not the companies, it’s going to be the taxpayers in some way, shape or
form”).
361. See, e.g., Charny, supra note 288, at 1638 (observing that “abandoning the employee
welfare system” in favor of government-based programs would require “a major change in political and legal culture”); Harry and Louise Ride Again, supra note 324 (observing that a push for
“a federal insurance scheme” in the United States “could kill health reform” due to opposition
from health insurers, employers, and health-care providers “fearing higher costs”).
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tional inequities in the United States.362 While I argue that stakeholderoriented corporate governance structures reflect a response to this, there
is no reason to believe that they could substantially mitigate it.363 Consequently, normative evaluation of these corporate governance systems
requires more than assessment against a narrowly defined set of efficiency metrics—it requires acknowledging and reckoning with the more
fundamental distributive politics that each system reflects.
Finally, it should be observed that my argument does not constitute a
prediction that pro-shareholder reforms will not make headway in the
United States, but rather that the stability and sustainability of any such
reforms would hinge to some degree on structures external to corporate
governance. In this light, it is noteworthy that institutional shareholders
long pushing for such reforms have finally made some headway during
the current crisis—a period in which the U.S. government has also pursued industrial policy in the automobile sector and engaged in a serious
effort toward national health care reform.364 It is equally noteworthy that
(at least as of this writing) movement toward shareholder empowerment
has remained tentative, and proposed health care reforms would maintain the predominantly employer-based system and fall far short of universal coverage.365
Contrary to what prevailing political theories of corporate governance would predict, the highly shareholder-centric corporate governance structure embraced in the United Kingdom reflects a political
362. See supra notes 293–99 and accompanying text; see also Anglo-Saxon Attitudes, supra
note 10; Levinson, supra note 213, at 553–55.
363. Cf. Millon, supra note 97, at 1022 (observing that board discretion to deviate from
shareholders’ interests does not equate to a stakeholder mandate).
364. See Shareholder Bill of Rights Act, S. 1074, 111th Cong. § 5 (2009) (“Shareholder Bill
of Rights Act,” introduced by Senator Charles Schumer, D-N.Y.); Editorial, The End of Private
Health Insurance, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at A14; Editorial, The Obama Autoworks, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009, at A20; Steve Lohr, In U.S., Steps Toward Industrial Policy in Autos, N.Y.
TIMES, May 20, 2009, at B1; Yin Wilzcek, In Split Vote, SEC Agrees to Propose Shareholder
Proxy Access Rule Amendments, CORP. L. DAILY (BNA), May 21, 2009; Press Release, Securities
and Exchange Commission, SEC Votes to Propose Amendments to Facilitate Rights of Shareholders to Nominate Directors, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-116.htm
(May 20, 2009).
365. See Fawn Johnson, New Comments Could Broaden Debate On Proposed SEC Proxy
Rules, DOW JONES NEWSWIRES, Dec. 30, 2009, available at http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/
stock-market-news-story.aspx?storyid=200912301351dowjonesdjonline000419; Press Release,
Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Re-Opens Public Comment Period for Shareholder
Director Nomination Proposal (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2009/2009-265.htm; Perry Bacon Jr., Senate Health-Care Bill Would Still Leave Millions
Uninsured, WASH. POST, Jan. 2, 2010, at A02; Robert Pear, Senate Passes Health Care Overhaul
on Party-Line Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 2009, at A1.
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happy medium where shareholder protections strong enough to induce
ownership dispersal have arisen, yet robust social welfare protections
have accompanied their recognition in law, neutralizing the potential for
backlash against shareholders within corporate governance itself. Ironically, then, American individualism and the correlative fear of “big
government”—cultural and social characteristics motivating the fundamentally private nexus conception of the corporation—may themselves
represent the most formidable barriers to politically sustainable shareholder-centrism in the United States.366

366. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The Economic Analysis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 602
(2006). Dau-Schmidt and Brun argue that these characteristics “make the United States a receptive environment for application of economic analysis to law.” Id. at 606. By contrast, the “communitarian” and “state-oriented” leanings of Europeans are said to render them less amenable to
economic analysis of legal problems, id. at 616, although they do clarify that the law and economics movement has been more successful in the United Kingdom than in France or Germany. Id. at
611; see also Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The Transatlantic Divergence in Legal
Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 295 (2008) (arguing that the rise of utilitarianism and legal realism in the United States
set the stage for the law and economics movement); Johnson, supra note 357, at 2248–49 (arguing that the appeal of economic analysis of law “cannot be explained solely by its descriptive
power,” and that its normative appeal reflects a “preference . . . for the prominence and centrality
of the individual in the traditions and thinking of [American] society”).

